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TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
ARLEN W. LANGVARDT* 
ABSTRACT 
With the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act of 2009, Congress launched a major expansion of its regulatory 
efforts regarding tobacco advertising and promotion. The Act restricts 
advertising in various ways, featuring a requirement for updated textual 
versions of health warnings long required for cigarette packages, as well as 
a requirement that cigarette advertisements must be accompanied by prom-
inently displayed color graphic images to be designed by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). 
The Act’s advertising restrictions and the color graphics requirement 
have been challenged on First Amendment grounds, as has an FDA regula-
tion setting forth graphic images that tobacco companies were to use. A 
federal court of appeals struck down the FDA regulation and sent the agen-
cy back to the drawing board, but another federal court of appeals upheld 
the color graphics requirement and most of the advertising restrictions in the 
statute. This Article analyzes the decisions in light of the various, sometimes 
inconsistent strains of First Amendment principles that the Supreme Court 
has adopted, explores what Congress and the FDA should be able to do in 
regulating tobacco advertising and promotion without violating the First 
Amendment, and recommends analyses for use in the event that the Supreme 
Court agrees to decide a tobacco advertising case. 
                                                                                                                         
* Professor of Business Law and Graf Family Professor, Kelley School of Business, 
Indiana University. 
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“[T]obacco use, particularly among children and adolescents, poses perhaps 
the single most significant threat to public health in the United States.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Although one might reasonably assume that the U.S. Surgeon General, 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the American Medical Associa-
tion, or an organization of anti-tobacco activists made the statement quot-
ed above, such an assumption would be incorrect. The observation came 
from the U.S. Supreme Court, which included it in two decisions from the 
not-too-distant past.2 
Each time it made the quoted statement, however, the Court proceeded 
to nullify a governmental attempt to combat this public health danger by 
restricting tobacco advertising and marketing practices.3 In a 2000 deci-
sion, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,4 the Court held that the 
FDA did not possess statutory authority to regulate tobacco products and 
that the federal agency’s tobacco regulations, which included advertising 
and marketing restrictions meant to protect minors, were therefore inva-
lid.5 A year later, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,6 the Court employed 
federal preemption and First Amendment grounds in striking down a 
state’s protection-of-minors-based regulations dealing with tobacco adver-
tising.7 The First Amendment analysis in Lorillard appeared to place sig-
nificant limitations on governmental ability to regulate tobacco advertising 
to a greater extent than contemplated by longstanding federal statutes that 
mandate health-related warnings and prohibit televised advertisements for 
tobacco products.8 
The one-two punch delivered by Brown & Williamson and Lorillard, 
though powerful in the short run, did not completely extinguish governmental 
efforts to regulate tobacco advertising and promotion. Continuing public 
                                                                                                                         
1 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000). 
2 Id.; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570 (2001). 
3 529 U.S. 120, 128, 161; 533 U.S. 525, 533, 570–71.  
4 529 U.S. 120. 
5 Id. at 125–27, 133, 155–56, 161. 
6 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
7 Id. at 546–51, 553, 561–67. 
8 Although the advertising restrictions at issue in Lorillard arose under state law, 
lessons from the Court’s First Amendment analysis are applicable to federal and state 
restrictions alike. See id. at 561–67. Federal law has long required that health warnings be 
placed on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 
(West 2014). In addition, federal law has banned tobacco advertisements from the 
television and radio airwaves for more than forty years. See id. § 1335. 
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health concerns and political considerations converged, resulting in a re-
newed federal push to regulate tobacco advertising and marketing in order 
to safeguard the health of minors, if not the public generally.9 Congress 
took a major step in 2009 by enacting the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act (TCA),10 which provided the FDA the regulatory 
authority held lacking in Brown & Williamson.11 The TCA also required 
the reissuance of nearly all of the FDA’s earlier protection-of-minors-
based tobacco advertising and marketing regulations, mandated the addi-
tion of graphic elements to the textual health warnings already required for 
cigarette packages and advertisements, and instructed the FDA to develop 
particular graphics-focused warning labels that cigarette producers would 
be required to use.12 
No longer able to lodge a lack-of-regulatory-authority objection, tobacco 
companies invoked the First Amendment in challenging the FDA’s tobacco 
advertising and promotion regulations as well as related TCA provisions.13 
Two 2012 federal court of appeals decisions concerning these challenges 
yielded divergent results.14 In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. 
United States,15 the Sixth Circuit upheld the bulk of the regulations and 
related statutory provisions, including the TCA’s requirement that graphic 
images be made a prominent part of the health-related warnings on packag-
ing and in advertisements.16 The Sixth Circuit did not rule on the constitu-
tionality of the particular graphics-focused warning labels the FDA devised, 
however, because the labels were not developed until after the district court 
had ruled and thus could not be considered on appeal.17 Later in 2012, how-
ever, the D.C. Circuit ruled in a case brought to challenge the actual labels.18 
                                                                                                                         
9 See Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation Over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 2009, at A1. 
10 Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 
123 Stat. 1776 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C. (2012)). 
11 Id. § 101, 123 Stat. 1786 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387). 
12 Id. § 102(a), 123 Stat. 1830 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1); § 201(d), 123 Stat. 
1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)). See id. § 201(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1843 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)); § 201(b)(2), 123 Stat. 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)). 
13 See generally Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 
(6th Cir. 2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
14 See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d 1205. 
15 674 F.3d 509.  
16 Id. at 531, 537, 544, 548, 551, 569. 
17 Id. at 552–54. 
18 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208. 
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In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration,19 the court 
held that the labels violated the First Amendment.20 
Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds initially seemed to be good can-
didates for U.S. Supreme Court review, but matters did not play out that 
way. In April 2013, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Discount To-
bacco.21 The FDA shortly thereafter ceased defending the labels tossed out 
in R.J. Reynolds.22 Rather than seeking to persuade the Supreme Court to 
hear the case, the FDA announced that it would abandon those labels and 
develop a new response to the statutory directive regarding the inclusion 
of graphic components.23 
After Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds, important questions re-
main. Was the Discount Tobacco court correct in largely upholding the 
advertising and marketing restrictions and requirements contemplated by 
the TCA and, most importantly, in sustaining the requirement that promi-
nent graphics components augment the mandated textual warnings? Was 
the R.J. Reynolds court correct in striking down the particular labels the 
FDA devised? What does the First Amendment permit the FDA to do in 
terms of designing graphics-focused labels? How should the Supreme 
Court rule if it later agrees to decide a case raising the sorts of issues Dis-
count Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds would have presented? This Article 
takes up those questions and related ones. 
Part I of the Article summarizes the history of federal efforts to regulate 
tobacco advertising and promotion, beginning with the cigarette label warn-
ing requirement instituted nearly fifty years ago and continuing through the 
TCA. Because government regulation of advertisements and product labels 
necessarily involves speech-related measures, Part II furnishes background on 
relevant First Amendment principles and especially Supreme Court decisions 
establishing that the First Amendment offers commercial speech an interme-
diate level of protection. As will be seen, the Court’s commercial speech 
precedents distinguish between content restrictions and required disclosures, 
with the government having somewhat greater latitude to require advertising 
disclosures than it has to restrict what may be said in commercial settings.24 
                                                                                                                         
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 1222. 
21 674 F.3d 509, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). 
22 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., U.S. Abandons Effort to Place Graphic 
Labeling on Cigarettes, HEALTHDAY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.healthfinder.go 
v/News/Article.aspx?id=674641. 
23 Id.  
24 Part II, infra, will also introduce related topics that are relevant to later sections of 
the Article: the Court’s tendency in recent years to bolster the strength of the intermediate 
protection extended to commercial speech without officially changing the controlling 
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Part III discusses the decisions in Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reyn-
olds. It also assesses those decisions in light of the commercial speech 
precedents examined in Part II. Part IV then turns to what the FDA and 
Congress can do, or should be able to do, regarding tobacco advertising 
and marketing regulation if the relevant Supreme Court precedents are 
adhered to and correctly applied. In addition, Part IV considers how the 
Supreme Court should resolve the key First Amendment issues if it hears a 
later challenge to tobacco advertising and marketing regulations of the sort 
required in or contemplated by the TCA. Part IV also adds cautionary 
notes about alternative rationales that some Justices might be tempted to 
put forth, but that the Court should reject, if it decides a tobacco advertis-
ing case or another case presenting similar issues. 
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION: 
HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
A. The FCLAA: Purpose; Warning Requirement; and Preemption 
After a 1964 report issued by a Surgeon General’s advisory committee 
called cigarette smoking a significant health hazard, Congress responded 
in 1965 with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
(FCLAA).25 The FCLAA’s § 1331 originally read: 
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to es-
tablish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling 
and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and 
health, whereby— 
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may 
be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each 
package of cigarettes; and 
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the max-
imum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by 
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regu-
lations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.26 
Approximately twenty years later, Congress replaced subsection (1) with a 
broader subsection that spoke of making “the public ... adequately informed 
                                                                                                                         
commercial speech principles to which the Court has adhered for more than thirty-five 
years; and the sentiment among some Justices that longstanding commercial speech 
principles do not extend sufficient First Amendment protection to such speech. 
25 Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 
282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (Supp. 1965)). 
26 Id. § 2, 79 Stat. at 282. 
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about any adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of 
warning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement 
of cigarettes....”27 Congress did not change subsection (2), which remains 
as originally enacted.28 
The FCLAA’s 1965 version required, in § 1333, that all cigarette pack-
ages carry this warning: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to 
Your Health.”29 In 1970, Congress strengthened the warning by requiring 
that packages prominently display this less equivocal statement: “Warning: 
The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Danger-
ous to Your Health.”30 Later amendments extended the warning require-
ment to cigarette advertisements and billboards, and provided for a rotating 
set of warnings focused on particular smoking-related health risks such as 
lung cancer, heart disease, or potential harm to a pregnant woman’s fetus.31 
As will be seen, the 2009 TCA called for further changes in the warning 
requirement and the manner in which the warning must appear.32 
Section 1334 of the FCLAA contains two measures that further § 1331’s 
stated purpose of avoiding “diverse [and] nonuniform” labeling and advertis-
ing requirements concerning the “relationship between smoking and 
health.”33 First, § 1334(a) provides that “no statement relating to smoking and 
health, other than the [warning] statement required by section 1333 of this 
title, shall be required on any cigarette package.”34 Second, § 1334(b) helps 
to establish the federal government as the primary regulator in the field by 
providing that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and 
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or 
                                                                                                                         
27 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 6(a)(1), 98 
Stat. 2200 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1970)). 
28 Compare Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 
§ 2, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1 1965)), with 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1331(2) (West 2014). 
29 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (amended 1970, 1984, 1985, and 2009). 
30 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1335 (1970)). Although “1969” appeared in 
the law’s title, actual enactment occurred in 1970. See id. 
31 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, § 4(b) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333); 
Act of Aug. 16, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-92, § 11(c), 99 Stat. 403 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333). 
A similar warning requirement exists regarding smokeless tobacco packages and 
advertisements. See 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (a)–(d) (2012). 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 89–104. 
33 § 1331(2). 
34 § 1334(a). Language added to § 1334(a) by the TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 201(a), 
202(b), 206, 123 Stat. 1842, 1845, 1849, created a limited exception to this prohibition for 
instances in which the Secretary of Health and Human Services requires a different 
formulation of the required warning. See § 1334(a). 
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promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity 
with the provisions of this chapter.”35 
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,36 the Supreme Court held that § 1334(b) 
preempted protection-of-minors-based Massachusetts regulations dealing with 
cigarette advertising and marketing.37 Broadly reading § 1334(b), the Court 
concluded that the statute contemplated preemption regardless of whether 
the state provisions regulated cigarette advertisements’ content or restricted 
their location.38 Among the Massachusetts regulations the Court struck 
down was a location restriction that prohibited placement of outdoor adver-
tisements for cigarettes within 1000 feet of schools, public parks, and simi-
lar places.39 In the TCA, Congress added subsection (c) to § 1334 and 
specified that notwithstanding subsection (b)’s preemption provision, 
states and localities “may enact statutes and promulgate regulations, based 
on smoking and health, that ... impos[e] specific bans or restrictions on the 
time, place, and manner, but not content, of the advertising or promotion of 
any cigarettes.”40 Seemingly an attempt to limit the sweep of Lorillard’s 
preemption ruling, subsection (c) should give states somewhat more room 
to regulate without risking preemption,41 though the First Amendment 
may still be a major obstacle.42 
B. The FCLAA: Electronic Media Advertising Ban 
A now-familiar feature of the FCLAA—its ban on radio and televi-
sion advertisements for cigarettes—did not appear in the statute’s 1965 
                                                                                                                         
35 § 1334(b). 
36 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
37 See id. at 532–36. The Massachusetts regulations also pertained to the advertising 
and promotion of other tobacco products such as smokeless tobacco. Id. At the time 
Lorillard was decided, federal law did not contain a preemption provision regarding state 
measures dealing with tobacco products other than cigarettes. See id. at 553. The TCA 
added a smokeless tobacco-related preemption provision that is similar to the cigarette-
related preemption rule of § 1334(b). See 15 U.S.C.A. § 4406(b) (West 2014). 
38 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 542, 548–51. 
39 Id. at 542, 548–51. The Court noted the broad language employed by Congress in 
§ 1334(b) and classified it as expansive enough to apply to even the location restrictions set 
forth in the Massachusetts regulations. Id. 
40 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)–(c) (West 2014). 
41 See id. 
42 For discussion of Lorillard’s treatment of First Amendment issues and what it 
suggests for state and federal regulation of tobacco advertising and marketing, see infra 
text accompanying notes 188–217. 
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version.43 Soon, however, a Federal Trade Commission report discussed 
the pervasiveness of broadcast media advertisements for cigarettes and the 
general influence of radio and television on young people. The report 
advocated banning cigarette commercials on radio and television.44 Con-
gress responded affirmatively with what became the FCLAA’s § 1335.45 
Shortly after the statute’s enactment, broadcasters challenged the § 1335 
ban on First Amendment grounds. In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitch-
ell,46 a 1971 decision, a three-judge federal district court rejected the plain-
tiffs’ constitutional challenge by a two-to-one vote.47 The Supreme Court 
affirmed without opinion a year later.48 
Tobacco companies were not among the plaintiffs in Capital Broadcast-
ing. The fact that the Supreme Court had not yet recognized First Amend-
ment protection for commercial speech as of the time of Capital Broadcast-
ing may help to explain tobacco companies’ decision not to challenge the 
electronic media advertising ban when it was enacted.49 However, there is 
                                                                                                                         
43 The ban appears at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (West 2014). It was added to the FCLAA 
by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1335 (1970)). 
44 See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 543–44; Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 
582, 585–86 (D.D.C. 1971) (decision of three-judge court). At the same general time, the 
Federal Communications Commission offered indications that it was considering 
adopting a ban on electronic media advertisements for cigarettes. See id. at 588 (Wright, 
J., dissenting). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). 
46 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971). 
47 Id. at 585–86. 
48 Capital Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), aff’g Capital Broad. Co. 
v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971). 
49 As later discussion will reveal, the Supreme Court did not recognize First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech until 1976, well after Capital Broadcasting. See infra text 
accompanying notes 137–41. That explanation, though reasonable, is not wholly convincing. 
Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright, who served by designation on the three-judge Capital 
Broadcasting court, dissented from the majority’s rejection of the broadcasters’ challenge 
and vigorously argued that the electronic media advertising ban violated the First 
Amendment because it effectively removed from the airwaves discussion of an important 
public controversy over the relationship between smoking and health. Capital Broad., 
333 F. Supp. at 587, 589–94 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright’s argument rested on 
First Amendment principles usually applied outside the advertising context. See infra text 
accompanying note 133. Although his First Amendment argument did not carry the day, 
the fact he made the argument and the further fact that the challenging broadcasters 
would have offered some version of it indicate that the tobacco companies could have 
asserted at least a plausible First Amendment argument if they had been inclined to 
challenge the statute, even though commercial speech protection had not yet been 
recognized by the Supreme Court. Interestingly, Judge Wright put forth the First 
Amendment argument despite also making comments suggesting his disdain for the 
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another possible explanation: tobacco companies believed they could bene-
fit if cigarette ads disappeared from television.50 They actively sought to 
persuade Congress to pass a differently formulated statute from which the 
desired disappearance of televised ads would have resulted,51 and they were 
content with the advertising ban Congress enacted instead.52 
                                                                                                                         
marketing practices of tobacco companies. See Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp. at 587–89, 
590 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
50 This seemingly counter-intuitive explanation (after all, why would cigarette 
manufacturers want a government-imposed restriction on their speech?) can be found in 
Judge Wright’s Capital Broadcasting dissent. 333 F. Supp. at 588–89 (Wright, J., 
dissenting). Judge Wright noted that two years prior to the 1969 enactment of the 
advertising ban, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) concluded that 
cigarette advertisements amounted to statements about one side of a controversial issue of 
public importance: the relationship between smoking and health. Id. at 587. The FCC, 
therefore, ruled that in view of the agency’s then-existing fairness doctrine and the public 
interest standard imposed on licensed broadcasters, television stations were required to 
broadcast anti-smoking messages if they aired cigarette advertisements. In re Complaint 
Directed to Station WCBS-TV, N.Y.C., N.Y., 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 381–82 (1967) (letter 
ruling); In re Television Station WCBS-TV, N.Y.C., N.Y., 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 938, 949 
(1967) (memorandum opinion affirming letter ruling). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit later upheld the FCC’s action. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 
1082, 1097–99, 1101–04 (D.C. Cir. 1968). According to Judge Wright’s Capital 
Broadcasting dissent, the required anti-smoking spots were so effective that they had “a 
devastating effect on cigarette consumption” during the late 1960s. 333 F. Supp. at 588 
(Wright, J., dissenting). Cigarette companies thus found themselves in a difficult position. 
As Judge Wright put it, “the individual tobacco companies could not stop advertising for 
fear of losing their competitive position; yet for every dollar they spent to advance their 
product, they forced the airing of more anti-smoking advertisements and hence lost more 
customers.” Id. 
51 While Congress was considering cigarette-related legislation in 1969, a cigarette 
industry representative appeared before a Senate subcommittee and indicated that the 
industry desired an antitrust exemption under which tobacco companies could agree with 
each other not to advertise on electronic media. See Cigarette Advertising and Labeling: 
Hearing on H.R. 6543 Before Consumer Subcomm. of S. Comm. on Commerce, 91st 
Cong. 78 (1969) (testimony of Joseph F. Cullman III, Chairman, Philip Morris, Inc.). See 
also Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp. at 588, 587 n.10 (Wright, J., dissenting). Because the 
FCC’s fairness doctrine ruling “had clearly made electronic media advertising a losing 
proposition for the [tobacco] industry, ... a voluntary withdrawal [of electronic media 
advertising] would have saved the companies approximately $250,000,000 in advertising 
costs ... and [would have] removed most anti-smoking messages from the air.” Capital 
Broad., 333 F. Supp. at 588 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright asserted that Congress 
“quickly complied” with the tobacco industry’s desires by making the broadcast 
advertising ban statutory in nature. See id. 
52 In Judge Wright’s view, the tobacco industry must have been content with the 
electronic media advertising ban, given that “as both the cigarette advertisements and 
most anti-smoking messages left the air, the tobacco companies [were able to transfer] 
their advertising budgets to other forms of advertising such as newspapers and magazines 
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Even though Supreme Court decisions have recognized significant First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech since Capital Broadcast-
ing,53 tobacco companies have not challenged the electronic media advertis-
ing ban.54 For more than forty years, therefore, § 1335 has proscribed the 
advertising of cigarettes “on any medium of electronic communication 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission.”55 
C. The FDA’s Ill-Fated Efforts During the 1990s 
As concerns continued regarding smoking and health and particularly 
the dangers to minors, the FDA mounted a significant regulatory effort 
during the mid-1990s.56 This effort featured various regulations that 
restricted the advertising and marketing practices of tobacco companies.57 
                                                                                                                         
where there was no fairness doctrine to require a response.” Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp. 
at 589 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright characterized the electronic media 
advertising ban as a “dramatic legislative coup for the tobacco industry” because “the 
cigarette smoking controversy [had been] removed from the air.” Id. As a result, “the 
decline in cigarette smoking was abruptly halted and cigarette consumption almost 
immediately turned upward again.” Id. at 589, 589 n.18. 
53 See infra text accompanying notes 137–58. 
54 The Supreme Court’s commercial speech decisions, see infra text accompanying 
notes 137–263, would give tobacco companies plenty about which to argue if they were 
inclined to challenge the electronic media advertising ban. Although the ban’s 
longstanding nature would not deprive them of the ability to contest its constitutionality, 
that longstanding nature nevertheless may be part of a strategic calculus undertaken by 
tobacco companies. With the lack of televised advertisements for cigarettes and other 
tobacco products being a fact of life for so many years, a constitutional challenge to the 
ban—even a successful constitutional challenge—could be perceived by the government 
and the public as an overreach. If the constitutional challenge were to succeed, there 
might be a backlash in which the government and private interest groups could decide to 
sponsor more anti-smoking spots on television and otherwise engage in enhanced efforts 
to communicate anti-smoking messages. Therefore, tobacco companies may well have 
decided that the status quo, in which they cannot advertise on television or radio but can 
widely advertise otherwise, is acceptable. 
55 15 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (West 2014). The ban took effect on Jan. 1, 1971. See Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 3, 84 Stat. 87 (1970). In 1973, 
Congress amended the radio and television advertising ban so that broadcast advertisements 
for “little cigars” were also prohibited. Little Cigar Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-109, 87 Stat. 
352 (1973) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1335). A similar ban on television and radio ads for 
smokeless tobacco has existed since 1986. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 4402(c) (West 2014). 
56 See generally Tobacco Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor & 
Human Res., 105th Cong. 48–50 (1998) (statement of William B. Shultz, Deputy 
Comm’r for Policy, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.). 
57 C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA BURROWS, RL32619, FDA REGULATION OF 
TOBACCO PRODUCTS: A HISTORICAL, POLICY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV. (2008), available at http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32619. 
2014]  TOBACCO ADVERTISING & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 343 
Tobacco companies challenged the regulations on lack-of-regulatory-
authority and First Amendment grounds.58 
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided FDA v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp.,59 holding that the FDA lacked authority to regulate tobacco 
products. The Court, therefore, invalidated the FDA regulations without 
reaching the First Amendment issues.60 The regulations would eventually 
obtain new life, however, as the following subsection reveals. 
D. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 
Legislative efforts to provide the regulatory authority held lacking in 
Brown & Williamson bore fruit in 2009 when Congress enacted the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA).61 The statute 
expressly granted the FDA regulatory authority over tobacco products,62 
authorized and instructed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
promulgate regulations dealing with tobacco product advertising and mar-
keting,63 and amended the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
in important respects.64 The discussion here will focus on the TCA provi-
sions dealing with tobacco product labeling, advertising, and marketing 
because those provisions have triggered First Amendment-based objec-
tions and are thus most relevant to this Article.65 Before turning to those 
                                                                                                                         
58 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
59 Id. at 126. 
60 Id. at 126, 133, 155–56, 161. As will be seen in the immediately following subsection, 
the TCA resurrected the invalidated regulations. Therefore, discussion of what the 
regulations called for will be deferred until that subsection. 
61 Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 387–387t (2012)). 
62 21 U.S.C.A. § 387a (West 2014). The TCA extended broad-ranging authority to the 
FDA, including, for instance, powers to develop tobacco product standards, regulate 
product ingredients, mandate submission of reports from tobacco companies, and require 
pre-market approval of new tobacco products that are not substantially equivalent to ones 
previously on the market. Id. §§ 387d, 387e, 387f, 387g, 387i, 387j, 387k. Congress 
specifically barred the FDA, however, from banning the sale of cigarettes and various 
other tobacco products. Id. § 387g(d)(3). 
63 Id. §§ 387a-1, 387f(d). 
64 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)–(d) (West 2014); see also id. § 4402 (amending smokeless 
tobacco warning requirements). 
65 For examination of the cases in which portions of the TCA have been challenged on 
First Amendment grounds, see infra text accompanying notes 308–406. For a further 
overview of the TCA, see Clay Calvert, Wendy Allen-Brunner & Christina M. Locke, 
Playing Politics or Protecting Children? Congressional Action & A First Amendment 
Analysis of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act., 36 J. LEGIS. 201, 
221–36 (2010). 
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provisions, however, it is useful to examine pertinent findings and state-
ments of purpose that Congress included in the TCA. 
1. Legislative Findings and Purposes 
In lengthy findings underlying the TCA,66 Congress repeatedly noted the 
health risks associated with smoking and set forth its conclusions regarding 
the influence of tobacco companies’ advertising and promotional activities on 
minors.67 Congress called nicotine an “addictive drug”68 and characterized 
minors’ use of tobacco products as a “pediatric disease of considerable pro-
portions that results in new generations of tobacco-dependent children and 
adults.”69 Congress also found that tobacco companies’ advertising and 
marketing activities “contribute significantly” to adolescents’ use of to-
bacco products containing nicotine,70 that past efforts to restrict such ad-
vertising and marketing had not sufficiently curbed adolescents’ use of 
tobacco products, and that “comprehensive restrictions on the sale, promo-
tion, and distribution of such products are [therefore] needed.”71 
Continuing its findings, Congress expressed concern about tobacco 
companies’ supposed practice of directing advertising toward minors72 and 
observed that minors are regularly exposed to tobacco advertising and pro-
motional activities.73 Such exposure creates “favorable beliefs” regarding 
tobacco use and “increases the number of young people who begin to use 
tobacco.”74 Tobacco marketing, Congress maintained, influences children 
                                                                                                                         
66 See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 387–387t (2012)). 
67 See id. § 2(1), (2), (5), (6), (13)–(15), (17), (18), (22)–(24), (29), (33), (47), (48). 
68 Id. § 2(3). 
69 Id. § 2(1). Those users, Congress found, risk experiencing “cancer, heart disease, 
and other serious adverse health effects.” Id. § 2(2). 
70 Id. § 2(5). 
71 Id. § 2(6). 
72 Id. § 2(15), (47), (48). 
73 Id. § 2(18). Congress observed that advertising “often misleadingly portrays” tobacco 
use as “socially acceptable and healthful to minors.” Id. § 2(17). In addition, Congress 
concluded that tobacco ads during sporting events and tobacco companies’ sponsorship of 
sporting events helped to create the impression that tobacco use could play a role in “the 
healthy lifestyle associated with rigorous sporting activity.” Id. § 2(19). 
74 Id. § 2(20). Congress found that a fifty percent reduction in the use of tobacco by 
minors “would prevent well over 10,000,000 of today’s children from becoming regular, 
daily smokers” and would save more than 3,000,000 of them from “premature death due 
to tobacco-induced disease.” Id. § 2(14). The related savings in healthcare costs, 
Congress asserted, would be roughly $75 billion. Id. Referring not merely to minors but 
to the public generally, Congress also noted that tobacco use is “the foremost preventable 
cause of death in America,” that it causes more than 400,000 deaths annually in the 
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more than it does adults.75 The findings reflected the legislative judgment 
that comprehensive advertising restrictions, including those in the previ-
ously invalidated FDA regulations, “will have a positive effect on the 
smoking rates of young people.”76 
The findings discussed above relate directly to three of the legislative 
purposes identified in the TCA. First, in a list of purposes connected with 
the grant of regulatory authority to the FDA,77 Congress sought to recognize 
the FDA as the primary federal regulator “with respect to the manufacture, 
marketing, and distribution of tobacco products….”78 Second, Congress 
wished to ensure that the FDA possessed “the authority to address issues of 
particular concern to public health officials, especially the use of tobacco 
by young people and dependence on tobacco.”79 Third, Congress sought to 
“promote cessation” of tobacco use and thereby “reduce disease risk and 
the social costs associated with tobacco-related diseases.”80 
The TCA’s stated purposes must be considered alongside those set 
forth for many years in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act (FCLAA)81 because the TCA amended certain aspects of the earlier 
law82 but left its purposes section untouched.83 As noted earlier, the 
FCLAA’s purposes section noted the objective of making the federal gov-
ernment the key regulator of cigarette labeling and advertising insofar as 
                                                                                                                         
United States, and that approximately 8.6 million Americans suffer from chronic illnesses 
related to smoking. Id. § 2(13). The findings labeled these problems a “public health 
crisis created by actions of the tobacco industry.” Id. § 2(29). 
75 Id. § 2(23). Congress found that “more than 80 percent of youth smoke three 
heavily marketed brands, while only 54 percent of adults, 26 and older, smoke these same 
brands.” Id. 
76 Id. § 2(25). See also id. § 2(30)–(32). The FDA regulations alluded to here are the 
ones invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2000 on the ground that the FDA lacked 
authority to regulate tobacco products. See supra text accompanying notes 58–60. 
Congress also considered other nations’ use of tobacco advertising restrictions and found, 
as a lesson from international experience, that “stringent and comprehensive [advertising 
regulations] have a greater impact on overall tobacco use and young people’s use than 
weaker or less comprehensive ones.” Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(27), 123 Stat. at 1778.  
77 Id. § 3(1)–(10). 
78 Id. § 3(1). 
79 Id. § 3(2). 
80 Id. § 3(9). Another stated purpose has partial relevance to the issues addressed in this 
Article. Congress indicated it wanted to “ensure that consumers are better informed…,” id. 
§ 3(6), though the remainder of that stated purpose went on to refer to the authority granted 
to the FDA to require tobacco companies to inform the public of the results of “research ... 
relating to the health and dependency effects or safety of tobacco products.” Id.  
81 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331–1341 (West 2014). 
82 See infra text accompanying notes 89–104. 
83 See § 1331, amended by Pub. L. 98-474, § 6(a), 98 Stat. 2204 (1984). 
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the relationship between smoking and health is concerned.84 In addition, 
the purposes section stated that the FCLAA-required warning statement 
for cigarette packages and advertisements was meant to serve as a means 
of “adequately inform[ing]” the public “about any adverse health effects 
of cigarette smoking.”85 Unsurprisingly, then, there exists considerable 
alignment between the FCLAA’s longstanding purposes and the objectives 
more recently articulated in the TCA. 
2. Labeling and Advertising Provisions: Changes in § 1333 
The FCLAA, as amended by the TCA, contains various provisions 
dealing with the labeling, advertising, and marketing of tobacco prod-
ucts.86 As the following discussion will reveal, these provisions mix direct 
regulation in the form of stated requirements or commands with indirect 
regulation through grants of authority to the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services (HHS Secretary), whose department houses the FDA.87 
In passing the TCA, Congress significantly changed the content and 
manner of display of the warning that must appear on cigarette packages 
and in cigarette advertisements.88 Congress amended § 1333 of the FCLAA 
by mandating that cigarette packages and advertisements contain, on a rotat-
ing basis, one of these nine statements (each of which must be preceded by 
the word “Warning” in all capital letters): 
 Cigarettes are addictive. 
 Tobacco smoke can harm your children. 
 Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease. 
 Cigarettes cause cancer. 
 Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease. 
 Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby. 
 Smoking can kill you. 
 Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers. 
 Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to 
your health.89 
                                                                                                                         
84 See id.; supra text accompanying notes 25–26. 
85 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331(1). 
86 Id. §§ 1333, 1335, 1335a. 
87 Id. §§ 1332(9), 1333, 1334, 1335a, 1341. 
88 Id. § 1333(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(3), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 201(a), (b), 
206 (2009). 
89 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 
§ 201(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1776, 1842 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) 
(2012)). Subsection 1333(a)(2) describes the specific typography requirements for the 
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These warnings preserve the general thrust of the rotating warnings 
previously required, but the new list expands the number of warnings in 
the rotation.90 The individual warnings in the new list tend to be shorter 
and less detailed than certain ones of the formerly required warnings91—
perhaps to make them simpler and more understandable and perhaps in 
recognition of new manner-of-display requirements to which we now turn. 
Section 1333’s previous version required a conspicuous display of the 
warning and included other warning size and appearance directives,92 but 
the TCA amendments establish even more specific and detailed manner-of-
display provisions.93 The amendments applicable to cigarette packages 
require that the warning appear in, and occupy, the upper fifty percent of the 
packages’ front and rear panels.94 Besides dictating that “Warning” appear 
in all capital letters prior to the remainder of the relevant text, the new ver-
sion of § 1333 requires, as a general rule, the use of seventeen-point type 
for the warning.95 The TCA amendments further call for the warning’s text 
to appear in black on a white background or white on a black background, 
in a manner that contrasts with other printed material on the package.96 
The new version of § 1333 established by the TCA reflects similarly 
detailed requirements concerning cigarette advertisements’ display of the 
warning.97 The warning and a statement regarding the tar, nicotine, and 
other similar content of the advertised cigarette, if such a statement is 
required by the HHS Secretary under authority granted elsewhere in the 
                                                                                                                         
warnings in (a)(1). 15 U.S.C.A. 1333(a)(2) (West 2014). See id. § 201(c), 123 Stat. at 1844 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (2012)). 
90 Section 1333’s previous version called for only four warnings to be in the rotation. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a), (c) (Supp. II 1984) (amended 1985, 2009). 
91 Compare, e.g., § 1333(a) (2012) (listing among rotating warnings called for in current 
version, “WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease,” “WARNING: Cigarettes cause 
cancer,” “WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease,” and “WARNING: 
Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby”), with § 1333(a) (Supp. II 1984) (listing 
among rotating warnings called for in superseded version, “SURGEON GENERAL’S 
WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May 
Complicate Pregnancy,” and “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking By 
Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight”). 
92 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (Supp. II 1984) (amended 1985, 2009). 
93 See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a)(2), (b)(1)–(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d), 123 Stat. at 1843 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2), (b)(1)–(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d) (2012)). 
94 Id. § 201(a)(2), 123 Stat. at 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2012)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d), (d) (e)(3) (West 2014) 
(original contains two subsections designated (d)).  
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statute,98 must occupy at least twenty percent of the advertisement’s phys-
ical area and must otherwise be displayed prominently at the top of the 
advertisement.99 Capital letters must be used for the word “Warning,” and 
the remainder of the warning’s text must appear in conspicuous, legible 
type that is black if the background is white or white if the background is 
black.100 The new § 1333 goes on to list other detailed display-related 
requirements, including provisions dealing with the width of a border in 
which the required warning must appear and provisions mandating the use 
of specified lettering sizes (which vary depending upon the type and di-
mensions of the particular advertisement).101 
In another major change, the TCA amendments to § 1333 went beyond 
the previous version’s focus on the text of the required warning and mandat-
ed inclusion of a graphics element.102 Congress directed the HHS Secretary 
to issue, within twenty-four months of the TCA’s enactment, regulations that 
“require color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smok-
ing” to accompany the warning’s text.103 Congress further stated that the 
Secretary would have the discretion to adjust the previously noted require-
ments regarding the warning’s language, type size, and format, “so that both 
the graphics and accompanying [warning] label statements are clear, con-
spicuous, [and] legible, and appear within the specified area.”104 
3. FDA Regulations Concerning Graphic Images 
In 2011, the Secretary issued regulations concerning nine graphic im-
ages devised in response to the congressional command to develop graphic 
                                                                                                                         
98 See id. § 1333(e). 
99 Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(b)(2), 123 Stat. at 1843 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (2012)). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. Similar warning and display requirements apply to smokeless tobacco packages 
and advertisements. See id. § 204, 123 Stat. at 1846 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
4402 (2012)). However, the smokeless tobacco warning requirements do not mandate use 
of a graphics element as part of the warning. See id. 
102 Id. § 201(d), 123 Stat. at 1845 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012)). 
103 Id. The Secretary issued the called-for regulations in 2011. See infra text 
accompanying notes 105–09; see also Cigarette Package and Advertising Warnings, 21 
C.F.R. §§ 1141.1–1141.16 (2012). 
104 Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(d), 123 Stat. at 1845 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1333(d) (2012)); see id. § 201(b)(2), (4), 123 Stat. at 1843, 1844 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2), (4) (2012)) (granting similar authority to HHS Secretary to 
vary display requirements); id. § 202(d), 123 Stat. at 1845 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1333(e) (2012)) (granting similar authority to HHS Secretary to vary display 
requirements, warning text, and color graphics if Secretary believes changes would help 
public understand dangers of using tobacco products). 
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images for use on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements.105 
The nine graphic images were integrated with the TCA’s nine required 
textual warnings106 and were to be used on a rotating basis.107 Each one 
also included a display of “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” a help-line phone number 
for persons seeking to kick the smoking habit.108 The graphic images fea-
tured these visual depictions (photographs except where noted): 
 A crying woman (accompanying the text about tobacco 
smoke causing fatal lung disease in nonsmokers). 
 An adult holding a small child with smoke visible in the air 
(accompanying the text about tobacco smoke harming chil-
dren). 
 A cigarette-smoking man who had smoke coming out of a 
tracheotomy opening (accompanying the text about ciga-
rettes being addictive). 
 Ugly-looking diseased lungs (accompanying the text about 
cigarettes causing fatal lung disease). 
 A dead, apparently autopsied body with a lengthy stitched-
up incision running down the chest (accompanying the text 
that “[s]moking can kill you”). 
 A baby receiving hospital care (a drawing accompanying 
the text that “[s]moking during pregnancy can harm your 
baby”). 
 A person with an oxygen mask over his mouth and nose as 
an apparent emergency measure (accompanying the text 
about cigarettes causing strokes and heart disease). 
 A person’s diseased-looking lips and rotted-out teeth (ac-
companying the text about cigarettes causing cancer). 
                                                                                                                         
105 21 C.F.R. §§ 1141.1–1141.16; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331(d) (West 2014) (statutory 
directive to Secretary). 
106 See supra text accompanying notes 89–90. 
107 Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(c), 123 Stat. at 1844 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1333(c)); see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1141.10, 1141.14 (2011). 
108 See Ann Simoneau, Office of Compliance & Enforcement Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., 
Compliance Training for Small Tobacco Manufacturers: Required Warnings for Cigarette 
Packaging & Advertising Final Rule 21 CFR 1141 (July 26, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/down 
loads/tobaccoproducts/resourcesforyou/forindustry/retailer/ucm265299.ppt (making graphic 
images in electronic files part of 21 C.F.R. §§ 1141.12 (2011) through incorporation by 
reference); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1141.16 (2011) (calling for smoking cessation-related 
disclosure to be part of required warnings). 
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 A man wearing a t-shirt that bore an “I Quit” inscription 
and a no-smoking symbol (accompanying the text that 
“[q]uitting smoking now greatly reduces risks to your 
health”).109 
As will be seen, a federal court of appeals decision identifying what it 
regarded as First Amendment problems with the graphic images just de-
scribed led the FDA to announce in 2013 that it would abandon those 
images and devise different ones.110 Nevertheless, the abandoned images 
remain relevant to this Article’s analysis of the leading decisions dealing 
with the TCA and to this Article’s consideration of what the federal gov-
ernment can and should be able to do in regulating tobacco labeling and 
advertising without violating the First Amendment.111 
4. FDA Regulations Concerning Advertising and Marketing 
Other TCA provisions dealing with tobacco product advertising and 
marketing included a section resurrecting the FDA regulations that the 
Supreme Court invalidated in 2000 in Brown & Williamson.112 Of course, 
the TCA’s grant of regulatory authority to the FDA removed the basis for 
invalidation identified in that decision.113 Congress, therefore, directed the 
HHS Secretary to reissue the earlier regulations with certain modifications 
outlined in the statute.114 The Secretary complied with a 2010 set of regula-
tions that reprised the earlier rules and restricted tobacco product advertising 
and marketing in various ways.115 
                                                                                                                         
109 See Simoneau, supra note 108; see also § 1141.12. 
110 See infra text accompanying notes 375–77. 
111 See infra text accompanying notes 414–84. 
112 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 155–56, 161 (2000). 
113 Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101, 123 Stat. at 1786 (2009) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 387a (2012)). 
114 See id. § 102(a), 123 Stat. at 1830–31 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1 
(2012)). 
115 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,225, 13,230–32 (Mar. 19, 
2010) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140). The FDA preceded the regulations with 
background information and explanations that touched on health issues, smoking rates 
(especially among minors), and tobacco product advertising in ways similar to the 
findings and statements of purposes that Congress articulated in the TCA. See id. at 
13,226–29 (discussing Background, Overview, and Scientific Information preceding 
rules in part 1140). For discussion of the congressional findings and statements of 
purpose, see supra text accompanying notes 66–85. 
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Product-distribution provisions in the 2010 regulations prohibited the 
sale of tobacco products to persons younger than eighteen years of age and 
generally required the checking of photographic identification to verify the 
age of purchasers other than those over the age of twenty-six.116 The regu-
lations also barred tobacco companies from distributing free samples of 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products except at adults-only facili-
ties,117 and prohibited the sale of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco prod-
ucts through vending machines and self-service displays except at facili-
ties where persons under the age of eighteen are not allowed.118 
Turning to cigarette and smokeless tobacco product advertising, the 
2010 regulations listed permissible types of advertising119 and mandated use 
of a text-only, black-and-white format in most instances.120 The regulations 
also barred the use of tobacco product brand names, symbols, logos, and 
                                                                                                                         
116 21 C.F.R. § 1140.14(a), (b) (2010). 
117 Id. § 1140.16(d)(1)–(2). The regulations contain a detailed list of conditions 
necessary for a facility to qualify for adults-only status. See id. § 1140.16(d)(2)(iii); see 
also id. § 1440.34(b) (prohibiting furnishing of gift of any non-tobacco item in 
consideration of purchase of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco). 
118 Id. §§ 1140.14(c), 1140.16(c)(1)–(2). Thus, a “direct, face-to-face exchange,” was 
to become the norm. Id. § 1140.14(c); see id. § 1140.16(c)(1)–(2). The regulations 
recognize a further exception, however, for mail-order sales. Id. § 1140.16(c)(2)(i). 
119 See id. § 1140.30(a)(1). The regulations listed these permissible advertising types: 
in newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or “other publications”; on “billboards, posters 
and placards”; in promotional material (whether point-of-sale or non-point-of-sale); and 
“in audio or video formats delivered at a point-of-sale.” Id. A tobacco seller intending to 
advertise in a medium other than those just listed must notify the FDA at least thirty days 
prior to the use of such advertising and must “discuss the extent to which the advertising 
... may be seen by persons younger than 18 years of age.” Id. § 1140.30(a)(2). 
120 Id. § 1140.32(a). In requiring such advertising to employ “only black text on a 
white background,” the regulation would bar uses of different colors, visual depictions 
other than of words, and graphic images. See id. The regulation recognized two 
exceptions, however, to the text-only, black-and-white format. One was for facilities 
where vending machine and self-service displays would be allowed (places to which 
persons younger than eighteen would not be admitted), assuming that the advertising was 
not visible from outside the facility. Id. § 1140.32(a)(1). See id. § 1140.16(c)(1)–(2). The 
other exception was for newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or other publications that 
qualify as adult publications. To so qualify, the publication’s readers under the age of 
eighteen cannot comprise more than fifteen percent of the readership, and the readership 
must include fewer than two million persons under the age of eighteen. Id. § 
1140.32(a)(2). As previously noted, supra note 119, the regulation states that audio or 
video advertising is allowed if it is “delivered at a point-of-sale.” Id. § 1140.30(a)(1). In 
such instances, the audio format (whether used with or without accompanying video) 
“shall be limited to words only with no music or sound effects.” Id. § 1140.32(b)(1). The 
video format “shall be limited to static black text only on a white background.” Id. § 
1140.32(b)(2). 
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slogans on non-tobacco items,121 and prohibited tobacco companies from 
using their products’ brand names and logos when sponsoring sporting 
events, other events, and sports teams.122 As will be seen, these advertising 
and marketing provisions have triggered First Amendment challenges.123 
5. Other TCA Provisions Dealing with Advertising and Promotion 
The TCA includes various other advertising- and promotion-related 
provisions. One such provision prohibits tobacco product manufacturers 
from making express or implied representations on product labels “or 
through the media or advertising,” that are likely to mislead consumers 
into believing that the FDA approved the relevant product, endorsed it, or 
deemed it to be safe for use by consumers, or that the manufacturer’s 
compliance with FDA requirements made the product less harmful.124 In 
addition, the TCA authorizes the HHS Secretary to adopt regulations par-
tially restricting access to, and advertising and promotion of, a tobacco 
product if the Secretary determines that such regulations would be “appro-
priate for the protection of the public health.”125 The TCA also prohibits 
                                                                                                                         
121 Id. § 1140.34(a) (prohibiting the placement of tobacco product brands and other 
similar indicia on t-shirts, hats, and many other promotional items). 
122 Id. § 1140.34(c) (permitting Tobacco companies to sponsor such events and use 
their official corporate name in doing so if that name is not the same as a brand name of 
its products). 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 308–446. The 2010 regulations did not include 
restrictions on placement of outdoor advertising of tobacco products—restrictions that 
had appeared in the mid-1990s regulations—because similar restrictions imposed at the 
state level had been struck down by the Supreme Court on preemption and First 
Amendment grounds in a 2001 decision. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 
525, 532–36, 561–64 (2001); Regulation Restricting the Sale and Distribution of 
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 75 Fed. Reg. 
13,225, 13,226 (Mar. 19, 2010) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140). In a 
background explanation preceding the 2010 regulations, the FDA stated that it was 
considering whether outdoor advertising placement restrictions might be crafted to 
comply with First Amendment constraints outlined by the Supreme Court, but that the 
agency was not then proposing any such rule. Regulation Restricting the Sale and 
Distribution of Cigarettes, supra. In studying the outdoor advertising issue, the FDA was 
following up on a TCA provision that authorized the FDA to consider ways (if any) to 
fashion such a rule without violating the First Amendment. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 387a-
1(2)(E) (West 2014). 
124 Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 103(b)(7)(tt), 123 Stat. at 1834 (2009) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 331(tt) (2012)). 
125 Id. § 906(d), 123 Stat. at 1796 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d) 
(2012)). This authority to restrict advertising and promotion extends, according to the 
statute, as far as the First Amendment permits. Id. 
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the making of false or misleading representations on tobacco product la-
bels and in advertisements for such products,126 and authorizes the HHS 
Secretary to promulgate a regulation requiring pre-approval of statements 
a tobacco company plans to include on product labels.127 
Although the TCA does not require that the FDA pre-approve advertis-
ing statements regarding tobacco products generally, it does so regarding 
those of the modified-risk variety.128 A modified-risk tobacco product is 
one in which the manufacturer: 
 expressly or impliedly represents, through labeling or ad-
vertising, that the product is meant to reduce the harm or 
risk of disease associated with other tobacco products; 
 represents that the product or its smoke contains less of a po-
tentially harmful substance than other tobacco products do; 
 uses the terms “‘light,’ ‘mild,’ or ‘low’ or similar de-
scriptors” on the product label or in advertising; or 
 takes action that is “directed to consumers through the me-
dia or otherwise” and would reasonably cause consumers to 
conclude that the product is less harmful or less likely to 
cause disease than are other tobacco products.129 
If a tobacco product meets any of the above criteria for modified-risk 
status, the product cannot be sold without the HHS Secretary’s pre-market 
approval.130 An application for such an order must include and describe 
“any proposed advertising and labeling.”131 
                                                                                                                         
126 Id. § 903(a), 123 Stat. at 1788–89 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387c(a)(1), 
(a)(7)(A) (2012)). 
127 Id. § 903(b), 123 Stat. at 1789–90 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387c(b) 
(2012)). Such a regulation would be designed to ensure compliance with the labeling 
requirements provided for in the TCA and relevant regulations. Id. However, Congress 
did not adopt a pre-approval rule regarding tobacco product advertisements, with the 
partial exception of advertisements for modified-risk products. Id. 
128 Id.; see id. § 911(d), 123 Stat. at 1813 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 387k(d)(1) (2012)). 
129 Id. § 911(b)(2), 123 Stat. at 1812–13 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 387k(b)(2) (2012)). 
130 Id. § 911(b)(1) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(a) (2012)). 
131 Id. § 911(d), 123 Stat. at 1813 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(d)(1) 
(2012)). As part of a decision to grant pre-market approval of a modified-risk tobacco 
product on the market, see id. § 911(g), 123 Stat. at 1814 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 387k(g) (2012)), the Secretary may also require that the product’s advertising 
and labeling enable the public to comprehend the relative health and disease risks 
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Because the TCA’s advertising and promotion provisions and related 
FDA regulations set forth speech-based requirements and restrictions, they 
have been challenged on First Amendment grounds. The leading appellate 
decisions addressing those challenges will be discussed and analyzed later 
in this Article.132 In order to lay a foundation for that analysis, this Article 
now examines relevant First Amendment principles as articulated and 
applied in Supreme Court decisions. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH: HISTORY 
AND OVERVIEW 
When interpreting the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has long 
distinguished between noncommercial speech and commercial speech. 
The former category, which receives “full” First Amendment protection, 
includes political speech and other noncommercial expression connected 
with literary, artistic, scientific, economic, or moral matters or with a 
broad range of subjects of public concern.133 Commercial speech, on the 
other hand, receives no more than “intermediate” First Amendment pro-
tection.134 The Court usually defines commercial speech as expression that 
“does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”135 Typical exam-
ples of commercial speech include advertisements for products, services, 
or businesses.136 
                                                                                                                         
associated with the product and those associated with non-modified risk tobacco 
products. Id. § 911(h), 123 Stat. at 1816 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(h) (2012)). 
132 See infra text accompanying notes 308–446. 
133 E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 340 (2010); Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 406, 412 (1989); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). 
A government restriction on the content of fully protected speech violates the First 
Amendment unless the government accomplishes the difficult task of demonstrating that 
the restriction is necessary to fulfill a compelling government purpose. E.g., Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 340. 
134 E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 749–57, 763–65, 770–72 (1976). 
135 E.g., id. at 776. Yet the definition of commercial speech has sometimes led to 
confusion and therefore may be in need of clarification. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Can 
You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 589–93, 605–15 (2012). 
136 E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996). Functional equivalents of advertisements, such as 
product labels, also constitute commercial speech. E.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 
U.S. 476, 478–80 (1995). 
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A. Intermediate Protection and the Controlling Test 
Until approximately forty years ago, the Supreme Court classified 
commercial expression as falling outside the First Amendment’s protective 
scope.137 After three decisions over roughly a decade laid the groundwork 
for a doctrinal shift,138 the Court held in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council139 that commercial speech merits a role 
in the First Amendment’s marketplace of ideas.140 The Court declined, 
however, to give commercial speech the “full” First Amendment protec-
tion extended to political speech and other noncommercial expression.141 
Two key distinctions informed the Court’s conclusion regarding the ap-
propriate level of protection: when faced with government regulation, 
commercial speech is more durable than noncommercial speech; and 
commercial speech’s accuracy or inaccuracy is more readily verifiable 
than is the accuracy or inaccuracy of noncommercial expression.142 The 
Court, therefore, recognized an intermediate level of First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech and made that level a maximum by 
                                                                                                                         
137 See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942). 
138 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821, 826 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384–85, 389 (1973); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964). For discussion of these decisions’ roles in 
laying the groundwork for the extension of intermediate First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech, see Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First 
Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 593–96 (2000). 
139 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. 
140 See id. at 756–57, 759–61, 762–63, 765. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
justified placing constitutional limits on the government’s ability to regulate commercial 
expression by noting that the First Amendment contemplates a right on the part of readers 
and listeners to receive information on matters of interest to them, that the information 
provided by commercial advertising may be of even greater interest to some persons than 
is information on political matters, and that if the First Amendment contemplates a right 
to receive information of interest, there must be a correlative right to speak regarding 
such matters. Id. at 753, 756–57, 762–63, 765. The law struck down in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy was one that prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices they 
would charge for prescription drugs. Id. at 763, 765. 
141 Id. at 770–71. See id. at 760–63, 765, 769–70. 
142 Id. at 771 n.24. It is unclear to what extent the Court continues to place significant 
weight on these distinctions as a basis for the less-than-full First Amendment protection 
extended to commercial speech. Compare, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484, 498–99 (1996) (citing the distinctions), with Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 
535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002), and Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 
U.S. 173, 183–92, 193–94 (1999) (finding no mention of the distinctions in either decision). 
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holding that it would apply to non-misleading commercial speech about 
lawful activities.143 
In a 1980 decision, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission,144 the Court began clarifying intermediate protection’s 
meaning by announcing a still-utilized four-part test that applies when a 
government restriction on commercial speech is challenged on First 
Amendment grounds.145 Part one of the test governs the determination of 
whether the relevant commercial expression may stake any claim to First 
Amendment protection by asking whether the commercial speech affected 
by the government regulation at issue pertains to a lawful activity and is 
non-misleading.146 If this threshold question yields a conclusion that the 
affected commercial speech merits intermediate protection, parts two 
through four of the test must be applied.147 The government’s passage of 
parts two through four means that the commercial speech restriction does 
not violate the First Amendment, whereas the government’s failure to 
clear any hurdle posed by parts two through four means that the restriction 
is unconstitutional.148 
In part two, the Central Hudson test asks whether a substantial gov-
ernment interest underlies the commercial speech restriction.149 The 
                                                                                                                         
143 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760–63, 765, 769–70, 771 n.24. See Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (using the term “intermediate scrutiny” to refer to Court’s 
analysis of restrictions on commercial speech). Misleading commercial speech would 
suffer the same fate to which all commercial speech formerly had been subjected: 
exclusion from the First Amendment’s protective scope. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 
425 U.S. at 771. The same would be true of commercial speech pertaining to an unlawful 
activity. Id. 
144  447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
145 Id. at 563–64, 566. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–72 
(2011) (applying the Central Hudson test but also suggesting an alternative analysis); 
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367–68 (2002) (applying the Central Hudson test). The test 
survived even though some Justices expressed dissatisfaction with it or proposed that it 
be modified or replaced in order to enhance protection for commercial speech. See 
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 
484, 496–500, 501–04, 507–08; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 431, 433–38 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
146 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. This part of the test has its roots in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy, which recognized intermediate First Amendment protection for 
nonmisleading commercial speech about a lawful activity but denied protection to 
commercial expression that misleads or promotes something illegal. Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760–63, 765, 769–70, 771 n.24. 
147 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
148 Id. at 563–64, 566. 
149 Id. at 566. 
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government normally has little difficulty passing part two because the 
cases have indicated that almost any interest related to the public’s 
health, safety, or welfare will suffice.150 Indeed, part two is nearly a 
given for the government. 
The same cannot be said, however, of parts three and four, which fo-
cus on the relationship—or “fit”—between the commercial speech re-
striction and the substantial interest the government seeks to further.151 
Part three requires the government to demonstrate that the challenged 
commercial speech regulation will directly advance the government’s 
underlying interest.152 To prove direct advancement, the government must 
show that the regulation will meaningfully contribute to the fulfillment of 
its interest.153 A trivial or attenuated connection between regulation and 
government interest is insufficient.154 
In part four, the Central Hudson test requires the government to show 
that the challenged commercial speech restriction is no more extensive 
than necessary to fulfill the underlying regulatory interest.155 Central Hud-
son itself and early applications of its test suggested that part four contem-
plated a least-restrictive-means analysis, under which a commercial 
speech regulation could pass muster only if it restricted absolutely the 
least amount of speech possible.156 A later decision instead established 
that the no-more-extensive-than-necessary formulation of part four re-
quires only that the restriction be “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective.”157 Part four thus contemplates a “reasonable” fit between 
                                                                                                                         
150 See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368–70 (finding substantial interests in both 
preserving effectiveness of federal drug approval process and ensuring availability of 
compounded drugs to persons needing them); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 504 
(finding a substantial interest in reducing public’s alcohol consumption); Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (finding a substantial interest in guarding against 
alcohol “strength wars”); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69 (finding a substantial interest 
in promoting energy conservation). 
151 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see Cent. 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64, 566. 
152 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
153 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993). 
154 See id. at 770–71; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
155 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64, 566. 
156 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 569–71; Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 
463 U.S. 60, 73–75 (1983). 
157 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see id. at 476–
78, 480 (labeling as dicta earlier decisions’ indications that part four of the test requires a 
least-restrictive-means analysis). But see id. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing 
that, in order to conclude that part four does not require a least-restrictive-means analysis, 
the majority had to “recast[] a good bit of contrary language in our past cases”). 
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commercial speech restriction and underlying government interest, not 
necessarily a “perfect” fit.158 
B. Narrowing of the Gap Between Intermediate and Full Protection 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy’s basic principle, that commercial speech 
can receive First Amendment protection but at most an intermediate degree 
thereof, remains in force, as does the related Central Hudson test.159 The 
rigor with which the Supreme Court applies parts three and four of the test 
serves as the key determiner of what intermediate First Amendment pro-
tection really means in relation to full protection.160 In various pre-1995 
applications of the test, the Court made intermediate protection appear 
significant by holding the government’s feet to the fire.161 Yet sometimes 
                                                                                                                         
158 Id. at 480. Accordingly, a commercial speech restriction that is not absolutely the 
narrowest one possible may still clear the part-four hurdle as long as that restriction is not 
unreasonably broad in its prohibition of speech. See id. at 477, 480. It remains important to 
explore other steps that the government might have taken and that would have furthered the 
underlying regulatory interest just as well without restricting as much (or any) speech. E.g., 
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 372–73 (2002); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–
91. Fox’s narrow-tailoring gloss seemed to be designed to make part four of the test easier 
for government to pass than if that part contemplated a least-restrictive-means analysis. See 
Fox, 492 U.S. at 477. As will be seen, however, the Court’s more recent decisions have 
applied the narrow-tailoring standard in a way that makes part four a difficult obstacle for 
the government to overcome. See infra text accompanying notes 164–263. 
159 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–72 (2011); Thompson v. W. 
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183–92, 193–94 (1999) (all applying Central Hudson test). 
But see Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662–67 (suggesting an alternative analysis not dependent 
on the Central Hudson test). The Central Hudson test has survived even though some 
Justices have expressed reservations about it. See infra notes 174, 182. 
160 As will be seen, a stern application of parts three and four of the Central Hudson 
test makes the test more difficult for the government to pass, enhances the likelihood that 
the commercial speech restriction at issue will be invalidated, and makes the intermediate 
level of First Amendment protection significant. On the other hand, a loose application 
that defers to the government’s judgments regarding the fit between the restriction and 
the underlying government interest makes the restriction more likely to be upheld and 
causes the intermediate level of First Amendment protection to seem less meaningful. See 
infra text accompanying notes 161–64. 
161 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568–71 (striking down regulation that prohibited 
utility companies from advertising public power services because regulation prohibited 
significantly more speech than was necessary to further energy conservation interest); 
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71–75 (striking down federal law that prohibited unsolicited mailings of 
advertisements for contraceptives because law would do little to further interest in helping 
parents control how and when children would be exposed to sensitive subjects and because 
the law restricted far more speech than was necessary to serve that interest); City of 
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the Court displayed little inclination to second-guess the government’s 
regulatory choices.162 
From 1995 on, however, the Court has consistently employed a stern 
analysis that carefully scrutinizes the relationship between the commercial 
speech regulation at issue and the underlying government interest.163 As the 
following discussion will reveal, those decisions have made parts three and 
four of the Central Hudson test very formidable obstacles for the govern-
ment to overcome and have effectively given commercial speech a level of 
protection not far removed from the full variety even though the level still 
carries the intermediate label.164 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,165 a 1995 decision, launched the current era 
in which the gap between intermediate and full First Amendment protection 
                                                                                                                         
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417–18, 424–25, 428, 430 (1993) 
(invalidating a city ordinance requiring removal of racks devoted to commercial advertising 
publications because the ordinance would do little to advance the city’s interests in safety 
and aesthetics and because other available regulatory options would have restricted less 
speech); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763–64, 767, 768–73 (invalidating a Florida rule 
that barred CPAs from personal solicitation of potential clients because the government 
offered only speculation regarding whether rule would advance interests in preventing fraud 
and coercion and in enhancing auditor independence). 
162 For instance, in Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 
(1986), the Court upheld a Puerto Rico law that banned commercial advertisements for 
casino gambling if the advertisements were directed toward residents and citizens of 
Puerto Rico. Id. at 330–33, 344, 348. The Court so held even though casino gambling 
was a lawful activity in Puerto Rico. Id. In applying parts three and four of the Central 
Hudson test, the Court paid great deference to the government’s regulatory judgments. 
The Court observed that it was in no position to second-guess the government’s 
conclusion that the advertising ban would directly further the government’s interest in 
protecting residents and citizens against the evils of casino gambling and would do so 
without restricting far too much speech. Id. at 341–44; see Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of 
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477–80 (1989) (expressing concern that the applicable test 
should not be made too difficult for government to pass, given that commercial speech 
receives intermediate, rather than full, protection); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 
U.S. 418, 427–31 (1993) (displaying deference to congressional regulatory choices in 
enacting a lottery advertising statute meant to accommodate interests of states that 
permitted lotteries and states that did not permit them). As will be seen, the Court’s more 
recent applications of the Central Hudson test neither display deference to the 
government’s regulatory choices nor voice concern about making the test too difficult for 
the government to pass. See infra notes 165–263. 
163 See infra text accompanying notes 165–263. 
164 Recent years’ decisions thus have gone a long way toward accomplishing, within 
the existing framework, the underlying objectives of those Justices who advocated 
changing the governing rules in order to provide greater protection to commercial speech. 
See infra notes 174, 182. 
165 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
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has been narrowing. In Coors, the Court struck down a federal statute and 
related regulations that prohibited disclosures of alcohol content on beer 
labels.166 Justice Thomas’s majority opinion acknowledged that in seeking 
to prevent “strength wars” among alcohol producers and guard against the 
negative public health effects that could result from such wars, the gov-
ernment possessed substantial interests for purposes of the Central Hud-
son test’s second element.167 However, the Court concluded that the ban 
on disclosing alcohol content on beer labels would not directly advance 
the prevention-of-strength-wars and public-health interests, in large part 
because the ban would be undercut by other federal regulations that per-
mitted alcohol content disclosures in many advertisements and that even 
required such disclosures on some alcohol product labels.168 
Turning to the Central Hudson test’s final element, the Coors Court 
concluded that the commercial speech restriction at issue was not narrowly 
tailored.169 The ban on disclosing alcohol content on labels prohibited far 
more speech than was reasonably necessary, including even disclosures 
that certain products would have a lesser alcohol content than others.170 In 
addition, the Court thought the government could have taken other steps 
that would have furthered its interests just as well as or better than the 
label restriction and would have done so without prohibiting speech.171 
For instance, it could have guarded against strength wars by mandating 
limits on the alcohol content permitted for beers.172 The government thus 
made a problematic choice, the Court indicated, in opting to regulate 
speech instead of the relevant product or activity.173 
                                                                                                                         
166 Id. at 478, 486–91. 
167 Id. at 482, 485, 491. The government did not want to see beer makers increase the 
alcohol content of their products and compete with each other on the basis of ever-
increasing alcohol strengths. See id. 
168 Id. at 488. The Court regarded the government’s regulatory regime as riddled by 
“overall irrationality” and as therefore unlikely to do anything meaningful to further the 
government’s objectives. Id. The government’s mere speculation about the possible 
effects of the commercial speech restriction was not enough to enable the government to 
carry its burden under part three of the applicable test. Id. at 488–90. 
169 Id. at 491. 
170 See id. at 490–91. Such information would be useful to those who might want a 
beverage containing less alcohol rather than more—presumably a good thing from a 
public health perspective. See id. 
171 Id. at 490–91. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. This same concern about using speech restrictions to effect desired changes 
regarding products, activities, or behaviors shows up in other decisions to be discussed. 
See infra notes 178–79, 186, 231–32. 
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A year after Coors, the Court considered a First Amendment-based 
challenge to a Rhode Island law that prohibited alcohol sellers from adver-
tising the prices they would charge. Speaking through a principal opinion 
and three concurrences in the judgment, all nine Justices agreed in 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island that the law could not stand.174 Eight 
Justices concluded that the government had failed the “fit” portions of the 
Central Hudson test.175 None displayed any inclination to defer to the 
government when determining the constitutionality of the advertising 
restriction at issue or of commercial speech restrictions in general.176 
In 44 Liquormart, Rhode Island failed part three of the applicable test 
because the Court saw nothing more than a tenuous, speculative relationship 
between the price advertising ban and the underlying government interest in 
                                                                                                                         
174 517 U.S. 484, 489, 497–514 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined at times by 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., and at times by Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.); 
id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518–28 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 528–32 
(O’Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring). Justice Stevens’s opinion 
spoke for only a plurality rather than a majority because some Justices were unwilling to 
subscribe to a portion of the opinion in which Justice Stevens proposed to alter the 
commercial speech framework by subjecting certain restrictions to the Central Hudson test 
and others to a somewhat higher level of scrutiny. See id. at 496–508, 509–14; id. at 517 
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518–28 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 528–32 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). For discussion and analysis of the framework changes Justice Stevens 
proposed in 44 Liquormart, see Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of 
Posadas and the Birth of Change in Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 
Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483, 518–34, 542–53 (1997). Justices Scalia and O’Connor 
premised their 44 Liquormart opinions on the view that there was no need to re-work 
existing commercial speech analysis in order to decide the case at hand. See 517 U.S. at 
517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 528–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Although he 
concluded that the Rhode Island law should be invalidated, Justice Thomas did not join 
the majority opinion because he favored a complete scrapping of the Central Hudson test. 
See id. at 518–28 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
175 See 517 U.S. at 504–08; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 528–32 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). For a listing of which Justices joined the majority opinion 
and which joined the O’Connor opinion, see supra note 174. In his concurrence in the 
judgment, Justice Thomas did not apply the Central Hudson test because he proposed to 
drop it entirely and devise a means of providing enhanced protection for commercial 
speech. See 517 U.S. at 518–28 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
176 See 517 U.S. at 496–514; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518–28 (Thomas, 
J., concurring); id. at 528–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Most members of the Court 
voiced disapproval of a 1986 decision in which the Court’s application of parts three and 
four of the controlling test had involved paying great deference to the government’s 
regulatory choices. See id. at 508–14; id. at 531–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The 1986 
decision was Posadas. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 
(1986); see supra text accompanying note 162. 
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reducing alcohol consumption.177 Moreover, Rhode Island failed part four 
because it could have furthered its interest in promoting temperance through 
various other ways that did not involve what the Court considered a sweep-
ing speech restriction.178 By listing non-utilized avenues that would have 
involved regulating alcohol sales without restricting speech, the 44 Liquor-
mart Court again appeared to indicate that challenged speech restrictions 
would likely trigger judicial concern if the government had not first attempt-
ed seemingly feasible regulation of the underlying product or activity.179 
A 1999 decision, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United 
States,180 featured unanimity on the outcome and near-unanimity on the 
rationale.181 The Court held that a federal statute banning broadcast adver-
tisements for gambling activities could not constitutionally be applied to 
casino gambling advertisements aired by radio and television stations that 
were located in a state where such gambling was lawful.182 Again rigorously 
                                                                                                                         
177 See 517 U.S. at 505–07; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 529–32 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting Rhode Island’s argument that if price advertising 
were banned, alcohol prices would stay higher than they otherwise would be, that the 
higher prices would lead to less alcohol consumption by the public, and that public health 
would therefore be improved). 
178 Id. at 507; id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). For instance, 
Rhode Island could have sought to further its temperance-promotion objective by 
increasing taxes on alcohol products, limiting quantities of alcohol that could be 
purchased, or launching enhanced educational campaigns regarding the dangers of 
excessive alcohol consumption. Id. at 507. 
179 See id. at 503–04, 507; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 526 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As Professor Stern has noted, “[t]he 
splintered opinions in 44 Liquormart should not obscure the fact that this decision 
heralded a more protective attitude toward commercial speech.” Nat Stern, In Defense of 
the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 72 (1999). For 
further analysis of 44 Liquormart, see Langvardt & Richards, supra note 174, at 518–58. 
180 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
181 Id. at 176. 
182 Id. at 176, 195–96. Justice Stevens, who had proposed altering the commercial 
speech framework in 44 Liquormart and ended up with only a plurality opinion there, see 
supra note 174, authored the majority opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting. 
After acknowledging that some members of the Court (himself included) had expressed 
views about how the commercial speech analysis might be modified in order to enhance 
First Amendment protection for commercial speech, Justice Stevens went on to disclaim 
any intent to make such proposals this time because the existing principles associated 
with the Central Hudson test were more than adequate to decide the case. 527 U.S. at 
184. The more modest approach won Justice Stevens seven more votes for his opinion, 
id. at 175, with only Justice Thomas not joining it. Although Justice Thomas believed 
that the statute at issue should be invalidated, he merely concurred in the judgment 
because he could not put aside his contempt for the Central Hudson framework. Id. at 
197 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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applying the Central Hudson test, the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
Court concluded that even if the government possessed substantial inter-
ests in guarding against the social ills associated with casino gambling and 
in assisting states that have chosen not to make such gambling lawful, the 
government failed parts three and four of the test.183 The Court questioned 
the soundness of the government’s part-three argument that the advertising 
ban bore a direct relationship to the interests underlying it.184 In addition, 
the Court observed that the advertising ban and the regulatory regime of 
which it was a part contained exceptions and inconsistencies that would 
tend to undermine whatever limited ability the ban might otherwise have 
had to advance the government’s purposes.185 
As for part four of the controlling test, the Court faulted the govern-
ment for having chosen a sweeping speech restriction when regulatory 
courses of action not involving speech could have been employed in an 
effort to further the government’s objectives.186 Given the second-
guessing of Congress in which the Court appeared quite willing to engage, 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting offered added indications of a narrow-
ing gap between intermediate and full First Amendment protection.187 
C. The Lorillard Decision: Narrowing of the Gap Continues 
The Court’s next commercial speech case, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly,188 served as its first, and still only, decision on whether restrictions 
on tobacco advertising and promotion violate the First Amendment.189 The 
challenged Massachusetts regulations dealt with sales of and advertise-
ments for cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars.190 The regulations 
                                                                                                                         
183 527 U.S. at 183, 185–96. 
184 See id. at 188–89. 
185 Id. at 190–95. 
186 Id. at 192–93. For instance, the government could have sought to combat the social 
ills associated with casino gambling by banning gambling on credit, restricting the use of 
cash machines on casino premises, limiting pot and bet sizes, restricting casino locations, 
or imposing certain licensing requirements. Id. at 192. The Court noted that although the 
“failure [of Congress] to institute ... direct regulation of private casino gambling does not 
necessarily compromise the constitutionality of [the advertising ban], it does undermine 
the asserted justifications for the restriction before us.” Id. Even if direct regulation of the 
underlying activity is not a mandatory prerequisite to implementation of a speech 
restriction, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting suggested a strong preference for trying 
direct regulation first. See id. at 192–93. 
187 See id. at 188–96. 
188 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
189 See id. at 553. 
190 Id. at 552. 
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reflected protection-of-minors purposes: to restrict underage consumers’ 
access to tobacco products; and to lessen the prospect that advertisements 
would induce underage persons to use such products.191 
Sales-practices regulations at issue in Lorillard prohibited retailers 
from using self-service displays of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, or ci-
gars, and required that tobacco products be located where consumers 
could obtain them only with assistance from a store clerk.192 The regula-
tions also imposed advertising restrictions, including a provision barring 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of tobacco products from using 
outdoor advertising in any location within 1000 feet of a public play-
ground, playground area in a public park, or elementary or secondary 
school.193 In addition, the regulations restricted point-of-sale promotion by 
providing that if advertising for tobacco products appeared inside a retail 
establishment within the requisite 1000-foot radius, no portion of the ad-
vertising could be placed lower than five feet from the floor.194 
As noted earlier in the Article, the Lorillard Court devoted much of its 
attention to a determination that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act preempted most of the Massachusetts regulations insofar as they 
pertained to cigarette advertising.195 The Court therefore found it neces-
sary to conduct a First Amendment analysis only in regard to the state 
regulations’ application to smokeless tobacco and cigar advertising and 
promotion.196 With a five-Justice majority striking down nearly all of the 
regulations as so applied,197 the decision left little doubt that the applica-
tion of the restrictions to cigarette advertising also would have failed to 
pass First Amendment muster if the application to cigarette advertising 
had not already succumbed to preemption.198 
                                                                                                                         
191 533 U.S. at 532–34. Manufacturers and retailers of tobacco products filed the 
constitutional challenge. Id. at 532. 
192 Id. at 534. 
193 Id. at 534–36. This prohibition also applied to advertising in enclosed stadiums and 
advertising within a retail establishment if the advertising was directed toward or visible 
from the area outside the establishment, assuming the stadium or establishment was 
located within the just-described 1000-foot radius. Id. 
194 Id. at 535–36. 
195 Id. at 540–53; see supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
196 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 553. As noted earlier, federal law then in existence did not 
contemplate a preemption argument concerning the state restrictions’ application to 
tobacco products other than cigarettes. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
197 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561–66. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices O’Connor (the author of the majority), Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 
532, 561, 561–66. 
198 See id. at 556–70. 
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Justice O’Connor began the First Amendment portion of the Lo-
rillard majority opinion by emphasizing that the Central Hudson test, 
and especially its third and fourth parts, would control the analysis.199 No 
issue arose concerning whether Massachusetts possessed a substantial 
underlying regulatory interest because none of the challenging parties 
disputed the significance of the government’s interest in curtailing tobacco 
use by minors.200 Later in its analysis, the Court labeled this interest as 
“substantial, and even compelling.”201 
Six Justices agreed that Massachusetts had passed part three of the 
applicable test in regard to the outdoor advertising restrictions.202 Writ-
ing for the six-Justice group, Justice O’Connor approvingly noted “the 
theory that product advertising stimulates demand for products, while 
suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect.”203 The six Justices 
also agreed that Massachusetts had appropriately relied on National Can-
cer Institute statistics and on FDA studies regarding the extent of, and 
possible influences on, minors’ uses of tobacco products.204 Because the 
                                                                                                                         
199 Id. at 553–55 (rejecting an argument that strict scrutiny should control the analysis, 
the Court saw no need to break new analytical ground in order to resolve the case). 
200 Id. at 555. 
201 Id. at 564. Still later, in a concluding portion of the majority opinion subscribed to 
by the five Justices who invalidated nearly all of the Massachusetts regulations, the Court 
added the observation with which this Article began: that “‘tobacco use, particularly 
among children and adolescents, poses perhaps the single most significant threat to public 
health in the United States.’” Id. at 570 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)). 
202 Id. at 557–61. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer concluded that Massachusetts had passed the third part of the 
controlling test. Id. at 556–61. Of those six Justices, only Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O’Connor were part of the five-Justice majority that ultimately struck down most 
of the advertising restrictions on the ground that Massachusetts had not passed part four 
of the test. Id. at 532, 561–66. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were the other three 
in the majority that held the government had failed part four. Id.; see id. at 571 (Kennedy 
& Scalia, JJ., concurring); id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring). Given what they regarded 
as the government’s obvious failure to pass part four of the test, Justices Kennedy and 
Scalia saw no need for the Court to decide whether the government passed part three. 
They also noted “continuing concerns that the [Central Hudson] test gives insufficient 
protection to truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech,” and cited those concerns as a 
reason not to agree with the Court’s application of part three of the test. Id. at 571–72 
(Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring). Justice Thomas made no specific mention of part 
three. He noted only that the government had not met its burden under the Central 
Hudson test and went on to explain at length why he favored jettisoning that test in favor 
of applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on truthful commercial speech. See id. at 572 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
203 Id. at 557. 
204 See id. at 557–60. 
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state had furnished “ample documentation of the problem with underage 
use” of tobacco products, the Court held that the state’s “decision to 
regulate advertising ... in an effort to combat the use of tobacco products 
by minors” reflected a close enough relationship to satisfy the direct-
advancement element of the controlling test.205 
The government’s success in Lorillard stopped there, however, as a 
five-Justice majority largely different from the six-Justice group that had 
resolved the direct-advancement element in the government’s favor con-
cluded that the outdoor advertising restrictions did not comply with the 
Central Hudson test’s final element.206 Justice O’Connor and the four 
colleagues who joined this portion of her opinion emphasized that the 
disallowance of advertising within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds, 
when coupled with local zoning regulations of general applicability, would 
result in an inability of tobacco manufacturers and other sellers to engage 
in outdoor advertising in approximately ninety percent of the geographic 
area in certain cities.207 The outdoor advertising restrictions thus constitut-
ed “nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information 
about smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult consumers.”208 
Continuing with a part-four analysis that revealed a clear willingness 
to second-guess the government’s regulatory choices, the five-Justice 
majority stressed that the state had not made a “careful calculation of the 
speech interests involved.”209 For instance, the Massachusetts regulations 
had not targeted “particular advertising and promotion practices that ap-
peal to youth,” as supposedly identified in relevant studies.210 In addition, 
the Court expressed concern that given the broad definition of advertising 
in the regulations, even a retailer’s oral communications with a would-be 
purchaser of tobacco products would violate the regulations if those com-
munications occurred outdoors.211 Hence, the outdoor advertising re-
strictions, rather than being narrowly tailored to the protection-of-minors 
                                                                                                                         
205 Id. at 561. 
206 For the relevant lineups of the Justices, see supra text accompanying note 202. 
207 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561–63. 
208 Id. at 562. The Court did not note that this “nearly … complete ban” applied only 
to outdoor advertising and not to such avenues of truthful communication as newspaper 
and magazine advertisements. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 563. 
211 Id. In noting this example, the Court invoked what would seem an atypical 
application of a regulation designed mainly to address advertisements in signs and 
billboards. See id. at 534–35, 536 (discussing Massachusetts regulations). With such an 
example helping to support a conclusion that the regulations were not narrowly tailored, 
the Court appeared to apply part four of the controlling test with considerable rigor. 
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interest, prohibited too much speech that adults would be entitled to re-
ceive.212 Those restrictions therefore violated the First Amendment.213 
The regulations’ point-of-sale advertising restrictions (the ones calling 
for in-store advertising to be placed at least five feet off the floor) fared 
even worse in Lorillard. The five Justices who agreed to strike down the 
outdoor advertising restrictions were joined by a sixth Justice in holding 
that the point-of-sale restrictions did not directly advance the govern-
ment’s underlying interest and were more extensive than necessary to 
further that interest.214 
Lorillard’s preemption and First Amendment-based rulings gutted the 
Massachusetts regulations except for the sales practices restrictions (the 
ban on retail outlets’ use of self-service displays of cigarettes, smokeless 
tobacco, and cigars, and the related requirement that consumers not have 
access to such items without the assistance of store personnel).215 Even 
assuming that those largely conduct-related provisions implicated speech 
interests sufficiently to warrant consideration of freedom of expression 
principles, the sales practices restrictions were held permissible under the 
First Amendment because they would directly further the government’s 
interest in restricting underage users’ access to tobacco products and were 
a suitably narrow means of doing so.216 Although the sales practices re-
strictions survived, it would be disingenuous to characterize Lorillard as 
anything other than a resounding victory for the tobacco companies. Espe-
cially through the Court’s rigorous application of part four of the Central 
Hudson test, Lorillard signaled that the intermediate protection for com-
mercial speech might not be much different from the full protection ex-
tended to noncommercial expression.217 
                                                                                                                         
212 Id. at 564–65.  
213 Id. at 562–64. The Court emphasized that despite the “substantial, and even 
compelling” nature of the interest in protecting minors, the government is not free to go 
overboard in restricting speech that adults have an interest in receiving. Id. at 564. The 
four Justices who dissented from the Court’s holding regarding part four would have 
remanded for further fact-finding regarding potential effects of the outdoor advertising 
restrictions and regarding other avenues of communication still available to sellers of 
tobacco products. Id. at 601–03 (Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 590 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
214 Id. at 532, 566–67. Justice Souter provided the sixth vote on these issues. Id. at 590. 
215 Id. at 569–70. 
216 Id. at 567–70. 
217 See id. at 561–66, 570–71. 
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D. Post-Lorillard Decisions: Greater Enhancement of Commercial Speech 
Protection 
A year after Lorillard, the Court decided Thompson v. Western States 
Medical Center.218 There, en route to striking down an advertising restriction 
set forth in a federal statute, a five-Justice majority applied the Central Hud-
son test strictly against the government219—“too strictly,” according to the 
four dissenting Justices.220 The advertising restriction at issue in Western 
States appeared in the compounded drugs sections of the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).221 Compounded 
drugs are produced by pharmacists who combine, mix, or alter ingredients in 
order to serve the particular needs of patients.222 Unlike drugs produced and 
sold on a widespread basis by pharmaceutical companies, compounded drugs 
are made available only on a special-needs, and usually small-scale, basis.223 
Because it would not be economically feasible for pharmacists who 
produce compounded drugs to complete the clinical trials necessitated by 
the usual requirement that drugs receive pre-market approval from the 
FDA, a requirement that compounded drugs receive FDA approval could 
lead many pharmacists to decide not to engage in compounding. There-
fore, in an effort to keep compounded drugs available for those who need 
them but do so in a way that would not undermine the purposes of the 
generally applicable FDA approval requirement,224 Congress provided in 
FDAMA that compounded drugs would not need FDA approval if phar-
macists providing them adhered to several limitations.225 Under one of 
these limitations, pharmacists could not advertise particular compounded 
drugs that they furnish, though they could advertise the more general fact 
                                                                                                                         
218 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
219 Id. at 360. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion. Id. at 359. As she had done in her Lorillard majority 
opinion, Justice O’Connor noted that some Justices had expressed dissatisfaction with the 
Central Hudson test over the years but that the test would be adequate for resolution of 
the issues in Western States. Id. at 367–68; see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 
525, 554–55 (2001). 
220 Western States, 535 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens & Ginsburg, 
JJ., dissenting). 
221 Pub. L. No. 105-115, sec. 127, § 503A(c), 111 Stat. 2296, 2330 (1997) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353a(c) (Supp. I 1997)); Western States, 535 U.S. at 357. 
222 Pub. L. No. 105-115, sec. 127, § 503A(a), 111 Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353a(a) (Supp. I 1997)); Western States, 535 U.S. at 360–61. 
223 Western States, 535 U.S. at 360–61. 
224 See id. at 368–69. 
225 FDAMA sec. 127, § 503A(a), 111 Stat. at  2328; Western States, 535 U.S. at 364. 
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that they provide a compounding service.226 Pharmacists who wished to 
advertise particular compounded drugs challenged this limitation as a First 
Amendment violation.227 
Part four of the Central Hudson test would be the government’s undo-
ing in Western States.228 The Court identified “non-speech-related means 
of drawing a line between compounding and large-scale manufactur-
ing,”229 and faulted the government for “not [having] offered any reason 
why [these] possibilities, alone or in combination, would be insufficient to 
prevent compounding from occurring on such a scale as to undermine the 
new drug approval process.”230 Making more explicit previous decisions’ 
suggestion that the government must ordinarily try regulating the underly-
ing activity before regulating speech concerning the activity,231 the Court 
stated that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that regu-
lating speech must be a last—not first—resort. Yet here it seems to have 
been the first strategy the Government thought to try.”232 
                                                                                                                         
226 Id. sec. 127, § 503A(c), 111 Stat. at 2330; Western States, 535 U.S. at 364–65. 
227 Western States, 535 U.S. at 365. 
228 See id. at 371–73. The Court conceded in Western States that, for purposes of part 
two of the controlling Central Hudson test, the government possessed sufficiently 
important public health and safety interests. Id. at 369–70. The Court also indicated that it 
would assume, without deciding, the soundness of the government’s argument that the 
advertising restriction would help to keep compounded drugs services from becoming 
large-scale endeavors and would thus directly advance the government’s interests in 
keeping such drugs available without creating a potentially huge exception to the FDA 
approval requirement. See id. at 371. 
229 Id. at 372. 
230 Id. at 373. The Court also expressed its disapproval of “the notion that the 
Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial 
information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with 
the information.” Id. at 374. 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 179–80, 187. 
232 Western States, 535 U.S. at 373. In a forceful dissent joined by three other Justices, 
Justice Breyer stressed that Congress needed to be able to restrict drug-compounders’ 
commercial speech to the extent it did in order to achieve its public health and safety 
goals. Id. at 378, 384 (Breyer, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
He listed the non-speech-related alternatives identified by the Western States majority 
and explained why each one would be either unfeasible or ineffective. See id. at 385–86. 
With the Court having “too readily assume[d] the existence of practical alternatives” to 
the advertising restriction, Justice Breyer faulted the Court for having “applie[d] the 
commercial speech doctrine too strictly.” Id. at 388. Justice Breyer supplemented this 
criticism with a warning about what he saw happening in the Court’s commercial speech 
decisions: 
[T]he Constitution demands a more lenient application ... that ... distin-
guishes between commercial speech and other forms of speech de-
manding stricter constitutional protection. Otherwise, an overly rigid 
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The Court’s most recent commercial speech decision, Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc.,233 further illustrates the trend of enhancing commercial 
speech protection through pro-advertising, anti-regulation applications of 
the Court’s precedents.234 Sorrell involved an attack on a Vermont statute 
dealing with pharmacy records that contained information on physicians’ 
individual histories of prescribing medications (referred to here as “pre-
scriber-identifying information”).235 The statute established a general rule 
that restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying infor-
mation, though this general rule was subject to exceptions.236 In addition, 
the law barred pharmacies from disclosing prescriber-identifying infor-
mation for marketing purposes and prohibited pharmaceutical companies 
from making marketing-related uses of such information.237 
Justice Kennedy eliminated any suspense about how the Court would 
rule by noting in the first paragraph of his opinion for a six-Justice majori-
ty that the Vermont law targeted “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical mar-
keting, ... a form of expression protected by the ... First Amendment.”238 
This meant, according to the opening paragraph, that the statute “must be 
subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny”—a standard that the statute 
“cannot satisfy.”239 
The Court noted the Vermont law’s impairment of “detailing,” a practice 
in which pharmaceutical companies’ sales representatives call on physicians 
in an effort to persuade them to prescribe particular medications.240 Detailing 
is more effective, the Court noted, when the sales representative knows the 
relevant physicians’ prescription histories and practices because the repre-
sentative can then more readily determine which physicians are likely to be 
                                                                                                                         
commercial speech doctrine will transform what ought to be a legisla-
tive or regulatory decision about the best way to protect the health and 
safety of the American public into a constitutional decision prohibiting 
the legislature from enacting necessary protections. 
Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
233 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
234 See id. at 2671; see also supra text accompanying notes 164–232 (discussion of 
earlier decisions illustrating same trend). As will be seen, Sorrell added a possible new 
wrinkle to the analysis of certain commercial speech cases. See infra text accompanying 
notes 245–50. 
235 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2653, 2656. 
236 Id. at 2656. 
237 Id. at 2659–60. 
238 Id. at 2659. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and 
Sotomayor joined Justice Kennedy in the majority. Id. at 2658–59. 
239 Id. at 2659. 
240 Id.  
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interested in certain drugs and can tailor a sales message accordingly.241 The 
prescriber-identifying information that is so useful to the sales representatives 
usually comes to them by way of data miners—companies that purchase 
prescriber-identifying information from pharmacies, analyze the information, 
and produce reports on which detailers rely in developing their sales pitch-
es.242 Vermont contended that the statute’s restrictions on marketing-related 
sales, disclosures, and uses of prescriber-identifying information were de-
signed to protect medical privacy interests, to shield physicians from harass-
ing sales behaviors by pharmaceutical representatives, and to lessen the 
likelihood that drug makers’ marketing efforts would lead to decisions to 
prescribe unnecessary or expensive medications.243 
For the Court, the statute’s marketing-themed restrictions were prob-
lematic because the statute also contained exceptions to the general rule 
restricting sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information.244 
Although marketing-related dissemination and uses of such information 
were prohibited, the statute permitted the information to be released and 
used for various other purposes (including research, educational, and law 
enforcement purposes, as well as purposes connected with a state program 
meant to provide physicians information on therapeutic, cost-effective 
generic alternatives to brand-name drugs).245 According to the Court, these 
exceptions to the general rule, when considered alongside the statute’s ban 
on marketing-related dissemination and uses, meant that the statute re-
stricted speech on the bases of content and speaker.246 The statute “disfa-
vors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content. More than that, 
[it] disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”247 
                                                                                                                         
241 Id. at 2659–60. Because detailing is expensive, drug companies use it mostly to 
promote the sale of brand-name drugs that are still under patent protection and therefore 
are likely to be higher-priced and particularly profitable. Id. at 2660. 
242 Id. Data miners and an association of pharmaceutical manufacturers launched the 
First Amendment-based challenge to the Vermont statute. Id. at 2661. 
243 Id. at 2659, 2668–70. In findings that accompanied the statute, Vermont’s legislature 
concluded that detailing increases healthcare and health insurance costs and encourages 
overly extensive reliance on new brand-name drugs as opposed to less expensive generic 
alternatives with established track records. The findings also revealed an apparent 
legislative intent to make detailing less effective by restricting the use of prescriber-
identifying information. Id. at 2661, 2663, 2671. 
244 Id. at 2663. 
245 Id. at 2660–61. 
246 Id. at 2663. 
247 Id. Elaborating on this point, the Court noted that “detailers cannot obtain prescriber-
identifying information, even though the information may be ... acquired by other speakers 
with diverse purposes and viewpoints,” and that detailers “are likewise barred from using 
 
372 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:331 
The Sorrell majority concluded that the Vermont statute’s disfavoring of 
marketing-motivated speakers and marketing-oriented messages should 
trigger “heightened scrutiny”—an analytical standard the First Amendment 
requires when the government regulates speech “‘because of disagreement 
with the message it conveys.’”248 The Court cited mainly noncommercial 
speech cases for the heightened scrutiny proposition, but stated that 
“[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”249 Although the Court did not ex-
plain the specifics of the heightened scrutiny it had in mind, it cited another 
noncommercial speech decision for the proposition that “[i]n the ordinary 
case it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content-based and, in 
practice, viewpoint-discriminatory.”250 However, after noting Vermont’s 
argument that the statute burdened only commercial speech, the Court stated 
that it would apply the Central Hudson test for commercial speech re-
strictions because “the outcome is the same whether a special commercial 
speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”251 
In applying the Central Hudson test, the Sorrell majority acknowledged 
that the government interests underlying the Vermont statute probably were 
sufficiently substantial to satisfy part two of the test, but concluded that the 
state failed the “fit” requirements established by the test’s final two parts.252 
The statute’s ban on marketing-related disclosures and uses of prescriber-
identifying information would not be likely to advance the medical privacy 
interests asserted by the state, given that the statute provided for numerous 
                                                                                                                         
the information for marketing, even though the information may be used by a wide range of 
other speakers.” Id. 
248 Id. at 2664 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
249 Id. Discovery Network contained statements dealing with the singling-out of 
disfavored commercial content, but the Court did not invoke a heightened scrutiny 
rationale in deciding the case. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 
U.S. 410, 418–19 (1993). Rather, the Court relied on the Central Hudson test in deciding 
Discovery Network. See id. at 417–18, 424–25, 428, 430–31. 
250 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulatiosn are presumptively invalid.”)). This 
statement and the supporting citation of a noncommercial speech decision could be read 
as indicating that the heightened scrutiny the Court envisioned would afford protection 
comparable to the full First Amendment protection normally extended to noncommercial 
speech. See id. at 2667. For a discussion of full First Amendment protection, see supra 
note 133 and accompanying text. 
251 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (suggesting that the heightened scrutiny the Court had 
been emphasizing would furnish potentially greater First Amendment protection than the 
intermediate protection contemplated in the commercial speech line of cases, even if the 
specific components of heightened scrutiny remain less than clearly defined). 
252 See id. at 2668–70. 
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exceptions under which such disclosures and uses of such information could 
take place.253 Moreover, other means short of the ban on marketing-related 
uses and disclosures could guard against supposed harassment of physicians 
by sales representatives.254 The government also failed to demonstrate a 
clear connection between the speech restrictions at issue and the state’s goals 
of reducing health care costs and lessening the chances that unnecessary 
medications would be prescribed.255 Finally, the Court expressed concern 
about the statute’s effect of prohibiting marketing communications that 
would provide helpful information and noted that the government cannot 
legitimately restrict truthful speech simply because the government fears it 
would be persuasive.256 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, dissented in order 
to protest the Sorrell majority’s heightened scrutiny discussion and to empha-
size that the Vermont statute’s effect on expression was “inextricably related 
to a lawful government effort to regulate a commercial enterprise.”257 He 
asserted that the Court had failed to distinguish between the “tight con-
straints” on government attempts to regulate noncommercial speech and the 
“looser constraints when the government seeks to restrict ... commercial 
speech ... or the regulation-related speech ... subject to a traditional regula-
tory program.”258 In addition, Justice Breyer worried that the heightened 
scrutiny approach called for by the majority could jeopardize many 
longstanding, highly detailed regulatory programs whose provisions con-
template speech oversight that is content-based or speaker-based.259 He 
expressed the concern that “[a]t best the Court opens a Pandora’s Box of 
                                                                                                                         
253 Id. at 2668. 
254 Id. at 2669. For instance, physicians could simply refuse to meet with sales 
representatives if they did not wish to meet with them. Id. 
255 See id. at 2670. 
256 Id. at 2670–71. 
257 Id. at 2673 (Breyer, Ginsburg, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting). 
258 Id. at 2673–74. Justice Breyer observed that “ordinary regulatory programs can 
affect speech, particularly commercial speech, in myriad ways.” Id. at 2675. Therefore, 
he continued, “to apply a ‘heightened’ First Amendment standard of review whenever 
such a program burdens speech would transfer from legislatures to judges the primary 
power to weigh ends and to choose means, threatening to distort or undermine legitimate 
legislative objectives.” Id. 
259 Id. at 2675–77. For instance, he noted, utility regulators typically oversee company 
statements regarding electricity or other utility-related services, the Federal Reserve 
Board reviews advertising and other statements by financial institutions, and the FDA 
“oversees the form and content of labeling, advertising, and sales proposals of drugs, but 
not of furniture.” Id. at 2677. 
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First Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that 
may only incidentally affect a commercial message.”260 
Sorrell indicates that some commercial speech restrictions—those that 
prohibit using information to communicate certain messages or viewpoints 
while simultaneously permitting uses of the same information to com-
municate favored messages or viewpoints—should be subjected to an as-
yet not clearly defined “heightened scrutiny.”261 It is important to note, 
however, that the Court stopped short of mandating heightened scrutiny 
for all commercial speech restrictions. Although the particular content and 
viewpoint discrimination identified in Sorrell proved problematic, Justice 
Kennedy noted that the interest in protecting consumers may permit the 
government to regulate commercial speech more readily than noncommer-
cial speech.262 The Court presumably would not have included such a 
statement and would not have applied the Central Hudson test in deciding 
                                                                                                                         
260 Id. at 2685. Justice Breyer also offered an ominous warning about what the Court’s 
analysis might suggest: 
[G]iven the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch upon 
commercial messages, the Court’s vision of its reviewing task threatens 
to return us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation 
for its interference with economic liberty. History shows that the power 
was much abused and resulted in the constitutionalization of economic 
theories preferred by individual jurists. 
Id. at 2679. He then provided a cautionary citation to Justice Holmes’s dissent in the 
long-discredited Lochner decision. Id. (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). According to Justice Breyer, if the Court “[a]t best ... 
opens [the] Pandora’s Box” identified earlier, it “[a]t worst ... reawakens Lochner’s pre–
New Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary 
economic regulation is at issue.” Id. at 2685. To decide Sorrell, Justice Breyer would 
have undertaken the less searching review applied to economic regulation that 
incidentally affects speech—a form of review less rigorous than the intermediate 
protection normally extended to commercial speech under Central Hudson. Id. at 2673, 
2675, 2679. He added, however, his view that the Vermont statute would survive a 
Central Hudson–focused analysis, given the state’s regulatory interests and the requisite 
degree of fit shown to exist between the statute and those interests. Id. at 2681, 2683–85. 
261 See id. at 2664–65. As will be seen, the Court’s heightened scrutiny comments are 
potentially problematic if they are given a life after Sorrell. See infra text accompanying 
notes 480–82; see also Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The 
Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 48–51 (2012); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, 
No Need to Break New Ground: A Response to the Supreme Court’s Threat to Overhaul 
the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 420–22, 424–30, 432–34 
(2012) (each criticizing Sorrell and forecasting problems if its heightened scrutiny 
rationale takes hold). 
262 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672. He also observed that Vermont “might have [had] a 
stronger position” if its statute had more narrowly defined the circumstances in which 
prescriber-identifying information could be used or disclosed. Id. 
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the case if it had intended to use the case as a vehicle for obliterating the 
First Amendment distinction between commercial speech and noncommer-
cial speech. 
Whatever one should make of Sorrell, it must be remembered that the 
commercial speech decisions discussed in this section of the Article—
from Virginia Board of Pharmacy in 1976 through Sorrell in 2011—all 
dealt with restrictions on commercial speech.263 Although those decisions 
have indicated that the intermediate level of protection for commercial 
speech is increasing in strength, there is another (and shorter) line of cases 
indicating that the government has more latitude to require commercial 
speech disclosures than to impose commercial speech restrictions.264 Be-
cause the cases dealing with required commercial speech disclosures hold 
potential relevance to the tobacco advertising issues addressed in this 
Article, the following subsection considers those decisions. 
E. Commercial Speech Cases Dealing with Required Disclosures 
A 1985 decision, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Su-
preme Court of Ohio,265 was in part a case that could have been discussed in 
an earlier subsection because it signaled that the intermediate level of First 
Amendment protection operates as a significant check on government-
imposed commercial speech restrictions. Applying the Central Hudson test 
in a pro-advertising manner,266 the Court held in Zauderer that sanctions 
placed on an attorney could not constitutionally be based on his violation of 
advertising restrictions267 set forth in Ohio bar disciplinary rules.268 
                                                                                                                         
263 See supra text accompanying notes 136–262. 
264 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 230, 252 
(2010); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 650-51 (1985); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-14, 717 (1977); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 755, 757, 
762, 763, 765 (1976); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 645, 46 
(1943). 
265 471 U.S. at 626. 
266 See id. at 637. The Court also noted that the Central Hudson test formed part of 
“[o]ur general approach to restrictions on commercial speech”—an approach that “is ... 
by now well settled.” Id. at 638 (emphasis added). 
267 Zauderer violated a disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from offering 
unsolicited legal advice and from accepting employment that resulted from offering 
unsolicited advice. Id. at 633, 639. In addition, his advertisements contained information 
other than the designated items of information permitted under another disciplinary rule. 
Id. at 632–33. The advertisements also transgressed a rule that prohibited attorneys from 
using illustrations and other visual elements in their advertisements. Id. at 632. 
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Zauderer’s main significance, with regard to the commercial speech 
doctrine, lies, however, in the part of the decision in which the Court 
outlined the appropriate analytical treatment of government-required 
disclosures in advertisements.269 An Ohio bar disciplinary rule at issue in 
the case also required that if an attorney’s advertisement referred to contin-
gent-fee rates on which the attorney would take cases, the advertisement 
had to disclose that the client could still be liable for costs even if the client 
lost the case and therefore owed no attorney’s fees under the contingent-fee 
arrangement.270 Zauderer had failed to make such a disclosure in advertise-
ments that made representations about contingent fees. The state maintained 
that absent the required disclosure, the advertisements were deceptive.271 
                                                                                                                         
268 Id. at 644, 649. The State attempted to justify the disciplinary rules at issue as 
prophylactic measures to prevent the deceptive, manipulative, and professionally 
unbecoming advertising that, in the State’s view, would inevitably occur in the absence 
of such restrictions. Id. at 633, 643–44. Disagreeing with the State’s inevitability premise, 
the Court concluded that the disciplinary restrictions swept far too broadly by prohibiting 
a great deal of advertising that would consist of truthful, non-deceptive, informative 
content. Id. at 646–47. Turning to the State’s ban on the use of illustrations and visual 
elements in attorneys’ advertisements, the Court classified such elements as important 
and protected aids in attracting attention to, and communicating the content of, the 
advertisements’ message. Id. at 647. “Accordingly,” the Court observed, “commercial 
illustrations are entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial 
speech”—meaning that “restrictions on the use of visual media of expression in 
advertising must survive scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.” Id. The restrictions did 
not survive that scrutiny, as the Court rejected the State’s argument that its application of 
the restriction to Zauderer’s accurate, non-misleading illustrations should be permitted 
because other attorneys’ uses of illustrations might be deceptive or manipulative. Id. at 
648–49. In language of potential importance to resolution of some of the tobacco 
advertising issues addressed in this Article, the Zauderer Court stated that 
[a]cceptance of the State’s argument would be tantamount to adoption of 
the principle that a State may prohibit the use of pictures or illustrations 
in connection with advertising of any product or service simply on the 
strength of the general argument that the visual content of advertisements 
may, under some circumstances, be deceptive or manipulative .... We 
are not persuaded that identifying deceptive or manipulative uses of 
visual media in advertising is so intrinsically burdensome that the State 
is entitled to forgo that task in favor of the more convenient but far 
more restrictive alternative of a blanket ban on the use of illustrations. 
Id. at 649. 
269 Id. at 651; see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 230, 252 (relying on 
Zauderer as controlling precedent dealing with legal treatment to be given to required 
commercial speech disclosures). 
270 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631, 633. 
271 Id. at 631, 633. As such, the advertisements also violated a separate rule prohibiting 
attorneys from engaging in deceptive advertising. Id. at 633, 652. 
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Rejecting Zauderer’s argument that the disclosure requirement should 
trigger the Central Hudson test and the same intermediate scrutiny applied 
to the state’s restrictions on advertising, the Court noted that the argument 
“overlooks material differences between disclosure requirements and out-
right prohibitions on speech.”272 The disclosure requirement did not prevent 
communication of information to the public; instead, the disclosure re-
quirement “only required [advertising attorneys] to provide somewhat more 
information than they might otherwise be inclined to present.”273 The 
Court acknowledged having “held that in some instances compulsion to 
speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on 
speech,”274 citing Wooley v. Maynard275 and West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette276 as among the decisions with such a holding.277 
But those decisions did not apply, the Zauderer majority stressed, because 
“the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those dis-
cussed in Wooley ... and Barnette.”278 Rather than “attempt[ing] to ‘pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein,’”279 Ohio had “attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in commercial advertising….”280 
Given that the value of the information provided in advertising served as 
the key reason why First Amendment protection had been recognized for 
commercial speech,281 the Court observed that Zauderer’s “constitutionally 
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his 
                                                                                                                         
272 Id. at 650. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 430 U.S. 705, 714, 717 (1977). 
276 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943). 
277 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650. 
278 Id. at 651. 
279 Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
280 Id. Moreover, Ohio merely required that Zauderer include “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information” in his commercial advertisements. Id. The case therefore 
would not be governed by the compelled speech decisions, which dealt with compulsion as 
to noncommercial expression of an ideological nature. See id. In Wooley v. Maynard, for 
instance, the Court held that New Hampshire could not prosecute a resident for having 
covered up, on moral and religious grounds, the “Live Free or Die” motto on his car license 
plates. 430 U.S. at 714, 717. In Barnette, the Court held that the State could not compel 
objecting students to honor the flag with statements and salutes. 319 U.S. at 646. 
281 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755, 757, 
762–63, 765. 
378 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:331 
advertising is minimal.”282 The Court noted that “because disclosure re-
quirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do 
flat prohibitions on speech,” its previous decisions had approved the use of 
required warnings or disclaimers to guard against consumer confusion or 
deception.283 In addition, the Court emphasized that its Central Hudson-
guided decisions on commercial speech restrictions “have recommended 
disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives 
to actual suppression of speech.”284 Accordingly, the Zauderer majority 
concluded that the Central Hudson test would be ill-fitting in the disclosure 
requirements context.285 
The Court observed that “unjustified or unduly burdensome” disclosure 
requirements might chill commercial speech and therefore raise First 
Amendment concerns, but went on to hold that “an advertiser’s rights are 
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably relat-
ed to the [government’s] interest in preventing deception of consumers.”286 
This holding recognized that “the First Amendment interests implicated by 
disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when 
speech is actually suppressed ....”287 Accordingly, Zauderer’s disclosure 
requirements test is less difficult—potentially much less difficult—for the 
government to pass than is the Central Hudson test that applies when com-
mercial speech restrictions are challenged.288 
No current Justices were serving on the Court when Zauderer was de-
cided.289 With the intermediate level of protection against commercial 
speech restrictions having seemed to increase in strength during the years 
                                                                                                                         
282 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. The Court also observed that “[t]he right of a 
commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not ... a 
fundamental right” of the sort that should trigger strict scrutiny. Id. n.14. As the Court’s 
analysis made plain, not even the intermediate scrutiny contemplated by the Central 
Hudson test would be warranted. See id. at 650–51. 
283 Id. at 651. 
284 Id. at 651 n.14. 
285 Id. at 650–51, 651 n.14. 
286 Id. at 651–52 (finding the particular disclosure requirement at issue easily qualified 
under the test the court enunciated because the requirement was reasonably related to the 
interest in guarding against consumer deception and because the court saw it as neither 
unduly burdensome nor likely to chill protected expression).  
287 Id. at 651, 651 n.14. 
288 See id. at 650–52. See also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 
U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (describing Zauderer’s disclosure requirements test as amounting to 
“less exacting scrutiny” than the scrutiny contemplated by the Central Hudson test).  
289 Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
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since Zauderer,290 would the current Court adhere to Zauderer’s disclo-
sure requirements test and the lesser degree of First Amendment protec-
tion that it contemplates for advertisers when the government mandates 
disclosures? The Court answered yes in a 2010 decision, Milavetz, Gallop 
& Milavetz, P.A. v. United States.291 
In Milavetz, the Court resolved a key foundational issue by determin-
ing that attorneys are “debt relief agencies” for purposes of the Bankrupt-
cy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.292 Therefore, 
unless the First Amendment operated to nullify them, disclosure require-
ments imposed on debt relief agencies by § 528 of the statute would apply 
to attorneys who advertise their bankruptcy services or advertise that they 
will furnish assistance to persons struggling with credit or debt problems. 
The disclosure requirements for bankruptcy services advertisements man-
dated inclusion of statements that the advertised services concerned 
“bankruptcy relief” and that the advertiser was a debt relief agency.293 
Similar disclosure requirements applied to advertisements for help with 
credit or debt problems, with those advertisements also having to disclose 
that “the assistance may involve bankruptcy relief.”294 
The Milavetz law firm failed not only in its attempt to persuade the 
Court that attorneys are not debt relief agencies but also in its First 
Amendment challenge to § 528’s disclosure requirements.295 Writing for 
all but one of her colleagues,296 Justice Sotomayor began the disclosure 
requirements analysis by noting that “the challenged provisions regulate 
only commercial speech.”297 Milavetz argued that the Central Hudson test 
should provide the controlling framework, but the Court disagreed.298 
Because § 528 was aimed at misleading commercial speech and set forth 
                                                                                                                         
290 See supra text accompanying notes 164–262. 
291 559 U.S. 229 (2010). 
292 Id. at 231–32, 235–36; see also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, sec. 226, §§ 101(3), 101(12A), 119 Stat. 23, 66–67 
(2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(3), 101(12A) (2006)). 
293 BAPACPA, sec. 229, § 528(a)(4), 111 Stat. at  71 (codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. § 528(a)(4) (2006)). 
294 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 233 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 528(b)(2)(A) 
(2006)). 
295 559 U.S. at 235–36, 249–53. 
296 Id. at 231–32, 235–36, 255 (resolving the attorneys-as-debt-relief-agencies issue in a 
nine-Justice majority opinion). Eight of the nine joined the disclosure requirements portion 
of the opinion. Id. at 231. In a partial concurrence in the judgment, Justice Thomas offered a 
different rationale for why the disclosure requirements did not violate the First Amendment. 
Id. at 255 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
297 Id. at 249 (majority opinion). 
298 Id. 
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“disclosure requirement[s] rather than an affirmative limitation on speech, 
... the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer governs our review.”299 
The Milavetz Court noted Zauderer’s statement that in the commercial 
speech setting, an advertiser has only a “minimal” constitutionally protected 
interest in not furnishing the relevant factual information required by law.300 
Observing that the required disclosures at issue resembled the required 
disclosures in Zauderer, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that in each case the 
government sought to “combat the problem of inherently misleading com-
mercial advertisements” by requiring disclosures that called only for accu-
rate statements of relevance to the services being advertised.301 Congress 
had determined that absent a disclosure of the possible role of bankruptcy in 
the debt relief assistance being advertised, such advertisements could 
mislead consumers.302 The Court, therefore, concluded that § 528’s disclo-
sure requirements were “‘reasonably related to the [Government’s] interest 
in preventing deception of consumers’” and were constitutionally permis-
sible under Zauderer.303 
Milavetz’s reaffirmation of Zauderer holds considerable significance 
because Milavetz was a nearly unanimous decision in which all but one of 
the current Justices participated.304 The “less exacting scrutiny”305 called 
for by the two decisions therefore continues to apply when the government 
requires commercial speech disclosures in order to prevent deception of 
consumers.306 As will be seen, the Zauderer-Milavetz test for required 
                                                                                                                         
299 Id. 
300 Id. at 250; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (stating that “disclosure requirements trench 
much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interest than do flat prohibitions on speech….”). 
301 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250. Although Milavetz argued that 
the firm’s advertisements had not been proven actually misleading, the Court stressed 
that Zauderer made such an argument unavailing and largely irrelevant. Zauderer, 
Justice Sotomayor explained, permits the government to adopt disclosure 
requirements in the commercial speech context in order to head off potential 
deception of consumers. Id. at 250–51. 
302 Id. at 251. 
303 Id. at 253 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
304 See supra note 296. Justice Kagan is the only current Justice who was not on the 
Court when it decided Milavetz. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
supra note 289. 
305 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249. 
306 Id. at 249, 253; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court 
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
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commercial speech disclosures will play an important role in resolving the 
tobacco advertising and promotion issues addressed in this Article.307 
With the foundational aspects of commercial speech doctrine having 
been explored, the remainder of the Article will explore the First Amend-
ment issues associated with current and possible future government efforts 
to regulate tobacco advertising and promotion. The immediately following 
section considers the two Court of Appeals decisions that have addressed 
the constitutionality of such provisions in the 2009 TCA and in related 
FDA regulations. 
III. FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISIONS REGARDING THE TCA AND FDA 
REGULATIONS 
As this section will reveal, the government generally fared well in Dis-
count Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, the first of the two 
appellate decisions resolving First Amendment-based challenges to TCA 
provisions and related FDA regulations.308 The second decision, R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, marked a significant defeat for the govern-
ment, however.309 Although the two decisions do not constitute a circuit 
split because they addressed different issues, they reflect little similarity in 
philosophical underpinnings and First Amendment mindsets.310 Discussion 
of the cases will proceed in the order in which they were decided. 
A. The Discount Tobacco Decision 
Tobacco companies and other tobacco sellers brought Discount To-
bacco as a challenge of almost all of the TCA’s advertising and promotion 
provisions.311 After the district court granted summary judgment to the 
                                                                                                                         
307 See infra text accompanying notes 345–57, 425–29, 456–61, 465–69. 
308 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United 
States, 133 S.Ct. 1996 (2013). 
309 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
310 See infra text accompanying notes 324–64, 377–405. 
311 See 674 F.3d at 520, 552–54. The list of challenged provisions included the TCA’s 
requirement that a to-be-devised graphics element be included as part of the health 
warning on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements. See id. The actual graphic 
images devised by the FDA were not at issue before the Sixth Circuit because those 
images were not developed until after the district court had ruled. Id. at 552–54. The D.C. 
Circuit’s later decision in R.J. Reynolds, on the other hand, focused on the 
constitutionality of the particular graphic images. See R. J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208, 
1222. The TCA’s only marketing-related restrictions not challenged in Discount Tobacco 
appear to have been the distribution restrictions that generally barred retailers from using 
self-service displays of tobacco products and called for such products to be available only 
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government on various issues and summary judgment to the plaintiffs on 
certain questions, the Sixth Circuit issued a decision largely upholding the 
district court’s rulings.312 At the outset of its analysis, the appellate court 
stressed the federal government’s extensive efforts to address the public 
health problems posed by minors’ use of tobacco products, summarized 
the supporting studies relied on by the government, and observed that 
there could be “no doubt” about the government’s “significant interest in 
preventing juvenile smoking and in warning the general public about the 
harms associated with the use of tobacco products.”313 The court cautioned, 
however, that manufacturers and other sellers of such products have a pro-
tected interest in furnishing truthful information to would-be purchasers and 
that adults have a corresponding interest in receiving such information.314 
The Discount Tobacco court devoted considerable attention to the First 
Amendment principles that would govern the case and consistently reject-
ed the plaintiffs’ various arguments that strict scrutiny should be applied 
to some or all of the challenged TCA provisions.315 The court instead 
concluded that the commercial speech thrust of those provisions ruled out 
the full First Amendment protection the plaintiffs sought.316 For the 
TCA’s restrictions on advertising and promotion, the previously discussed 
Central Hudson test and the intermediate scrutiny it contemplates would 
control the analysis.317 For the statute’s provisions amounting to disclosure 
                                                                                                                         
with the aid of retail store personnel. See supra text accompanying notes 116–18. Two 
possible reasons come to mind for the Discount Tobacco plaintiffs’ decision not to 
challenge those restrictions: first, they are primarily conduct restrictions that affect 
speech only incidentally; and second, the Supreme Court held in 2001 that very similar 
distribution restrictions imposed by Massachusetts did not transgress the First 
Amendment. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567–70 (2001). 
312 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 517–18. The Sixth Circuit resolved most issues 
unanimously, but by a two-to-one vote on a key question. Judge Clay authored the 
majority opinion’s sections to which all three judges subscribed. Judge Stranch wrote the 
majority opinion’s section upholding the TCA’s mandate that a graphics element be 
included as part of the required health warning, with Judge Clay dissenting from that 
ruling. See id. at 517. 
313 Id. at 519. The court also cited the Supreme Court’s previous observation that the 
government’s interest in curtailing minors’ use of tobacco products is “‘substantial, and even 
compelling.’” Id. (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001)). 
314 Id. at 520. 
315 Id. at 522–26. 
316 See id. at 522, 525–26, 532–33, 549–50. 
317 Id. at 522–23, 534–37, 541–43. 
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requirements, the previously discussed Zauderer test and its less-than-
intermediate scrutiny would furnish the guiding principles.318 
1. Various TCA Provisions Upheld 
The Article’s earlier summary noted that the statute restricted the 
marketing of modified-risk tobacco products by requiring pre-market 
approval for a tobacco product if its labeling or advertising represented 
that it was less harmful than other tobacco products or if the labeling or 
advertising employed descriptive terms such as “light” or “mild.”319 
Disagreeing with the plaintiffs’ argument that this requirement amounted 
to a prior restraint triggering strict scrutiny because it would sweep in 
not only commercial speech but also noncommercial speech on public 
health matters, the Discount Tobacco court noted Supreme Court prece-
dent indicating that commercial expression is not rendered otherwise by 
the mere inclusion of comments on noncommercial issues.320 The court 
reasoned that the modified-risk product provisions’ references to labeling 
and advertising contemplated restrictions on commercial speech only and 
did not impair tobacco companies’ ability to comment in noncommercial 
contexts on public health issues.321 
Turning to the controlling Central Hudson test, the Sixth Circuit noted 
the government’s substantial underlying interest in preventing consumers 
from being deceived by misleading claims about tobacco product safety.322 
To support its conclusion that the modified-risk product requirements would 
directly advance the prevention-of-deception interest in a narrowly tailored 
manner, the court cited evidence of tobacco companies’ history of making 
misleading health-related claims about their products.323 Although tobacco 
companies would have preferred that the government opt for “post-market 
review of deceptive claims” instead of the pre-market regime established by 
the modified-risk product rules, the court concluded that “the government 
                                                                                                                         
318 Id. at 523–24, 527, 554–69. The Supreme Court has described Zauderer’s test for 
required commercial speech disclosures as “less exacting scrutiny” than the intermediate 
scrutiny contemplated by the Central Hudson test. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. 
United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010). 
319 See supra text accompanying notes 128–31. 
320 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 532–33 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983), for the proposition that statements linking a product to a matter of 
public debate do not turn speech that is otherwise commercial into fully protected 
noncommercial expression). 
321 Id. at 532–33, 537. 
322 Id. at 534–35. 
323 Id. at 535–37. 
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has made a reasonable determination that, in the context of a deadly and 
highly addictive product, it would be a virtual impossibility to unring the 
bell of misinformation after it has been rung.”324 The Sixth Circuit, there-
fore, unanimously upheld the modified-risk product provisions.325 
As noted earlier, the TCA also barred tobacco product manufacturers 
and sellers from making representations, in labeling, advertising, or through 
the media, that would mislead consumers into believing that the products 
being sold had FDA approval, that the FDA had deemed the products safe, 
or that the products were less harmful to users’ health by virtue of FDA 
regulation.326 The plaintiffs argued for strict scrutiny because the provi-
sion’s reference to representations through “the media” could apply to non-
commercial speech by persons outside the tobacco industry.327 The Sixth 
Circuit disagreed, instead construing the statute as reaching only commer-
cial speech by that industry.328 Employing reasoning similar to its reasoning 
in upholding the modified-risk product rules, the court unanimously sus-
tained this TCA provision as an appropriately tailored way of furthering 
the government’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.329 
The Discount Tobacco plaintiffs also failed in their challenges to the 
TCA’s previously discussed restrictions on tobacco companies’ distribution 
of free samples of their products, on their use of tobacco product names, 
logos, or symbols on non-tobacco merchandise, and on their use of tobacco 
product names in event sponsorship.330 The Sixth Circuit noted that those 
restrictions dealt with forms of advertising and either restricted speech di-
rectly or targeted an activity’s communicative impact.331 But they were 
constitutionally permissible restrictions on commercial speech because they 
would directly advance the government’s interests in curtailing minors’ use 
of tobacco products and lessening inducements to engage in that unhealthy 
practice, and would do so in narrowly tailored ways.332 
                                                                                                                         
324 Id. at 537. 
325 Id. 
326 See supra text accompanying notes 124–27. 
327 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 533. 
328 Id. at 549–50. 
329 Id. at 551. In so holding, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, which had 
erroneously applied strict scrutiny to the measure in question. Id. 
330 Id. at 539–43. For earlier discussion of these restrictions, see supra text 
accompanying notes 116–22. 
331 See 674 F.3d at 538–39. 
332 See id. at 539–43 (holding that banning the distribution of free samples except at 
adults-only facilities was a logical way of keeping tobacco products out of the hands of 
minors). The prohibition on use of tobacco product names, logos, and symbols on non-
tobacco items was appropriate as well, given the high percentages of adolescent smokers 
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In its conclusions regarding the above restrictions, the court refused to 
accept tobacco companies’ argument that there is little meaningful rela-
tionship between advertising and consumer behavior.333 Such an argument 
“stretches the bounds of credulity,” the court scoffed, especially when one 
considers the billions of dollars spent on tobacco advertising each year.334 
Emphasizing tobacco companies’ continued need to recruit new users of 
their products, the court indicated that the relationship between advertising 
and consumer behavior should be taken especially seriously when minors 
are exposed to tobacco advertising.335 
2. Color Graphics Mandate and Other Required Warning 
Provisions Upheld 
As discussed earlier, the TCA required that color graphics be included 
as a significant element of the rotating warnings mandated for use on ciga-
rette packages and in cigarette advertisements.336 The statute also specified 
size and appearance requirements for display of the warnings.337 In sus-
taining the graphic images requirement and the related prominence-of-
display commands, the Discount Tobacco court devoted greater attention 
to those provisions than to any of the other challenged TCA provisions.338 
                                                                                                                         
who possess tobacco-branded merchandise and the reasonableness of the assumption that 
ongoing exposure to such brand-awareness efforts could make tobacco product use 
attractive to minors. See id. at 541–42. As for the ban on using tobacco product names in 
sponsoring events, the measure was a suitably crafted way of curtailing a very visible (to 
minors) brand-awareness device on which tobacco companies had spent huge sums of 
money. Id. at 542–43. Tobacco companies interested in sponsoring events could still use 
their corporate names in doing so, as long as those names were not the same as a tobacco 
brand. Id. at 543. 
333 Id. at 539–41. 
334 Id. at 539–40. The court noted that in the 2001 Lorillard decision, the Supreme 
Court recognized the soundness of a conclusion that advertising stimulates demand. Id. at 
541; see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557–61 (2001). The Sixth Circuit 
also refused to accept the tobacco companies’ argument that the vast sums they spend on 
advertising are meant solely “to attract and retain adult consumers.” Disc. Tobacco, 674 
F.3d at 540. According to the court, “it is impossible to believe that promotion so 
successful in the adult context that it is valued by Plaintiffs at $13 billion dollars [the 
amount spent on tobacco advertising during a recent year] had absolutely no effect on 
anyone below the age of eighteen.” Id. 
335 See id. at 540–41. 
336 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 
§ 201(d), 123 Stat. 1776, 1843 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) 
(2012)); see also supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
337 See supra text accompanying notes 92–101. 
338 See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 554–69. 
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The court stressed that it was deciding only whether the TCA violated the 
First Amendment by requiring that the health warnings include a color 
graphics element to be devised by the FDA.339 The court was not ruling on 
the constitutionality of the particular graphic images devised by the FDA 
in response to the TCA’s instruction.340 
All three judges on the Discount Tobacco panel agreed that strict scru-
tiny should not govern their analysis of the warning requirement and the 
textual and graphic content called for by the TCA, despite the plaintiffs’ 
argument they supposedly were being made mouthpieces for the govern-
ment’s views in a subjective and controversial government-dictated mar-
keting campaign against their products.341 The court observed that the 
textual portions of the rotating warnings dealt with matters that experts 
widely accepted as fact regarding health risks of tobacco use and were, in 
any event, merely versions of warnings long required by federal law.342 
Moreover, the fact that the warnings must appear on product packages and 
in advertisements made the requirement a commercial speech matter (a 
conclusion not altered by the TCA’s directive that a color graphics element 
accompany the textual warnings).343 The court’s unanimity disappeared, 
however, when discussion turned to which set of commercial speech princi-
ples—those coming from Central Hudson regarding restrictions or those 
coming from Zauderer regarding required disclosures—should control the 
case.344 Judge Stranch wrote for a two-judge majority in holding that Zau-
derer not only controlled but also furnished a basis for sustaining the color 
graphics requirement.345 
                                                                                                                         
339 Id. at 529–30. 
340 Id. at 520, 552–54. The Sixth Circuit stressed that the plaintiffs had brought “only 
a facial challenge” in which they “argue that the [TCA’s] graphic-warnings requirement 
is itself unconstitutional, not that the specific images the FDA chose to implement the 
requirement are unconstitutional.” Id. at 552. Because the actual images the FDA devised 
did not come into being until after the district court had ruled, the particular images were 
not part of the appeal. Id. at 552–54.  
341 Id. at 523–27. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the public 
already knows the health risks of tobacco product use and that the TCA’s requirements 
made the mandatory warnings overly intrusive. Citing the government’s showing that 
minors do not fully understand these risks and have a tendency to underestimate some of 
them, the court noted that the warning requirement was designed to lead to better 
understanding of the health risks. Id. at 524–25. 
342 Id. at 525–26. 
343 See id. at 526–27. 
344 Id. at 551–52. 
345 Id. at 551–69; see also id. at 527–30 (Clay, J., dissenting in part) (authoring most 
of the majority opinion and otherwise joining in it, but dissenting on the ground that the 
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Judge Stranch’s portion of the Discount Tobacco majority opinion stat-
ed that the TCA’s warning requirement was a disclosure requirement in its 
textual and graphic elements.346 Although the textual elements could more 
readily be classified as required disclosures of factual matters, the graphic 
elements merited the same classification because the TCA contemplated 
that the graphic elements would complement and help explain the factual 
information in the textual elements.347 This meant that Zauderer’s treatment 
of required disclosures furnished the governing framework.348 
Under the test devised in Zauderer and recently reaffirmed by the Su-
preme Court, disclosures required by the government in the commercial 
speech context are permissible under the First Amendment if they are 
reasonably related to the prevention of consumer deception.349 The Dis-
count Tobacco majority concluded that the TCA-mandated warning (includ-
ing its textual and graphics components) was meant to guard against the 
prospect that consumers could suffer from misconceptions regarding the 
nature and extent of the health risks associated with tobacco product use.350 
As such, the warning requirement served to prevent consumer deception or 
similar erroneous understandings regarding important health concerns.351 
Having determined that the TCA’s warning requirement was a disclo-
sure requirement and that it was meant to prevent consumer deception or 
similar misimpressions regarding health risks, the court still needed to 
decide whether the requirement was reasonably related to the deception-
prevention (or similar) purpose.352 The court said it was related because 
the textual components of the rotating warnings called for statements of 
fact about health risks and because the graphic elements, besides offering 
                                                                                                                         
Central Hudson test should have been applied and would have resulted in invalidation of 
the color graphics requirement). 
346 Id. at 551, 558. 
347 See id. at 558–59. 
348 See id. at 551, 558. 
349 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249–50 
(2010); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
350 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–63. 
351 See id. at 558–63; see also id. at 556–58 (discussing a Second Circuit Court 
decision where the court used the Zauderer test when analyzing a similar warning). The 
court noted the record’s considerable evidence indicating that the public does not fully 
and accurately understand the particular health risks posed by tobacco use even if there is 
widespread awareness that use of such products is not a healthful practice. Id. at 562–63. 
Moreover, the court noted that the Zauderer approach applies regardless of whether the 
disclosure requirement addresses actual deception or potential deception. Id. at 558. 
352 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. The Discount Tobacco court characterized the 
Zauderer test as contemplating “rational-basis” review. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–62. 
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factual information, would augment the communication process by attracting 
attention to the warnings and making them more understandable.353 The 
majority noted evidence of tobacco companies’ past behaviors involving 
misleading consumers or conspiring to cover up negative health-related 
information, and observed that despite the longstanding presence of 
warnings on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements, the pub-
lic still did not fully understand the health risks.354 Therefore, it was 
reasonable for the government to sharpen the warnings and require use 
of graphic images to make the warnings less likely to be ignored and the 
messages communicated by them more likely to resonate with consum-
ers.355 The court also noted that other countries have required prominent-
ly displayed graphic elements in health warnings regarding tobacco 
products and presumably have thereby achieved greater effectiveness in 
communicating health risks.356 This further evidence suggested that Con-
gress had acted reasonably in enacting the TCA provisions at issue.357 
                                                                                                                         
353 See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562–64. Citing language from another part of 
Zauderer regarding the importance of the ability to use graphic elements in advertising as 
a communication aid, see Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647, the court stressed that graphic 
elements can be just as accurate as textual elements. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 559–60. 
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647–49. These observations enabled the court to dispose of the 
plaintiffs’ argument that in imposing the requirement of including graphic images, 
Congress was requiring tobacco companies to communicate opinions rather than facts. 
See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558–61. In an interesting aside that probably was 
unnecessary for resolution of the case but holds relevance for the issues addressed later in 
the Article, the court listed hypothetical examples of graphic images that would be factual 
in nature and therefore “would be scrutinized [under Zauderer] for a rational basis.” Id. at 
559. It noted that “a graphic could consist of one of the required textual warnings—
‘WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children.’—written in what appears to be a 
child’s handwriting.” Id. The court went on to cite additional examples of graphic images 
amounting to factual disclosures: 
[A] picture or drawing of a nonsmoker’s and smoker’s lungs dis-
played side by side; a picture of a doctor looking at an x-ray of either 
a smoker’s cancerous lungs or some other part of the body presenting 
a smoking-related condition; a picture or drawing of the internal 
anatomy of a person suffering from a smoking-related medical condi-
tion; [and] a picture or drawing of a person suffering from a smoking-
related medical condition. 
Id. 
354 See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562–64. 
355 Id. at 561–64. 
356 Id. at 565–66. 
357 Id. at 565–67; see id. at 531, 569. In a partial dissent in which he argued for 
application of the Central Hudson test rather than the Zauderer test, Judge Clay 
contended that the TCA’s requirement of a graphics element was unprecedented and not 
narrowly tailored to furtherance of the government’s interests. Id. at 527–30 (Clay, J., 
dissenting in part). Judge Stranch’s majority opinion on the graphics requirement asserted 
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The Sixth Circuit devoted more brief attention to the TCA’s detailed 
manner-of-display requirements for the rotating warnings.358 It concluded 
that in requiring the warnings to occupy the top half of the front and back 
of cigarette packages, approximately one-third of the front and back of 
smokeless tobacco packages, and twenty percent of an advertisement’s 
space, Congress acted permissibly.359 The court believed that the manner-
of-display requirements were “reasonably tailored to overcoming the in-
formational deficit regarding tobacco harms” and that the government had 
demonstrated that “larger warnings materially affect consumers’ aware-
ness of the health consequences of smoking and decisions regarding 
tobacco use.”360 
In addition, the court rejected as “unpersuasive” the tobacco companies’ 
argument that the manner-of-display requirements were “unduly burden-
some because the scale of the warning label drowns out their speech….”361 
The Sixth Circuit did not give credence to the plaintiffs’ argument that such 
prominently displayed labels “might dissuade certain smokers from buying 
their product by making it appear unhealthy or otherwise unattractive.”362 
Such an effect was not constitutionally problematic, the court seemed to 
suggest.363 It saw nothing wrong with the government’s requiring truthful, if 
unpleasant, information in labels and advertisements as part of an effort to 
curtail minors’ use of tobacco products.364 
3. TCA Provisions Struck Down 
Although Discount Tobacco resulted in various wins for the govern-
ment, the tobacco companies did prevail on certain issues.365 They 
achieved a minor victory in the court’s striking down of a TCA provision 
                                                                                                                         
that in conducting his assessment of the graphics requirement, Judge Clay was not only 
relying on the wrong test but was allowing himself to be influenced by the particular 
graphic images chosen by the FDA—images whose constitutionality was not an issue 
before the court. Id. at 567–69 (majority opinion). 
358 See id. at 524–31. 
359 Id. at 524, 530–31. 
360 Id. at 530. 
361 Id. The tobacco companies had made no showing, the court observed, that the 
remaining portions of their packages and advertisements constituted insufficient room 
for the display of their product names, logos, and other information. Id. at 530–31; see 
id. at 567. 
362 Id. at 531. 
363 See id. 
364 See id; see also id. at 569 (observing that even if a graphic image were to depict 
something unpleasant and therefore cause a “visceral” reaction on the part of those who see 
it, the image could still be a factual disclosure and therefore permissible under Zauderer). 
365 See id. at 537–39, 541–44. 
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that barred the furnishing of non-tobacco items in return for purchases of 
tobacco products.366 This provision would have restricted tobacco compa-
nies’ ability to continue so-called continuity programs involving adult 
purchasers of their products: programs in which regular purchasers would 
receive other merchandise as a reward for being good customers.367 The 
court invalidated the restriction because, insofar as such programs are 
geared toward adult purchasers, the TCA provision did not bear a sufficient 
relationship to the statute’s protection-of-minors purposes.368 
The Discount Tobacco plaintiffs achieved a bigger victory concerning 
the TCA’s previously discussed provision that restricted tobacco advertis-
ers’ use of color imagery. This provision permitted use of only a black-and-
white format (black text on a white background, or vice-versa) in most 
forms of tobacco advertising.369 The court rejected the government’s argu-
ment that uses of color in tobacco advertisements are inherently misleading 
and thus properly subject to a prophylactic ban.370 Instead, the government 
would have to follow a tougher route: proceeding after the fact against 
advertisers whose particular uses of color could be proven deceptive.371 
Moreover, the court believed that the ban on color imagery swept far 
too broadly in restricting speech.372 The court again invoked Zauderer, but 
this time to point out that decision’s discussion of commercial speech 
restrictions and the Supreme Court’s comments on the value to advertisers 
of being able to use color in order to attract interest and aid communica-
tion.373 The Sixth Circuit therefore struck down the restriction on uses of 
color imagery.374 
                                                                                                                         
366 See id. at 537–38, 544. 
367 Id. at 537–38. 
368 See id. at 543–44. The invalidated restriction thus was different from the TCA’s 
previously discussed no-free-samples provision, which the court upheld because of its 
direct connection to the interest in removing inducements for minors to use tobacco 
products. Id. at 541; see Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 
229, 249–53 (2010). 
369 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
370 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 547–48. 
371 See id. at 546–48. 
372 Id. 
373 See id. at 547; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985). Zauderer thus played dual roles in Discount 
Tobacco: furnishing the controlling framework for assessing the TCA’s disclosure 
requirements, see supra text accompanying notes 345–57, and shedding light on how to 
evaluate sweeping commercial speech restrictions. See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 547. 
374 Id. at 548. 
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B. The R.J. Reynolds Decision 
Whereas Discount Tobacco involved an attack on various TCA provi-
sions, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA375 focused much more narrowly 
on a government action related to the TCA but different from any re-
striction or requirement addressed in the earlier case. In R.J. Reynolds, 
tobacco companies challenged the particular graphic images devised by 
the FDA in response to the TCA’s directive to develop graphic images for 
inclusion in the required warning on cigarette packages and in cigarette 
advertisements.376 The D.C. Circuit held that the FDA-devised graphic 
images violated the First Amendment.377 
Writing for a two-judge majority, Judge Brown sent early signals about 
the ultimate outcome of the case. In background information, the court 
stated that in a proposed regulation soliciting comment on thirty-six graphic 
images under consideration, the agency advocated “a dramatic expansion of 
the existing health warnings” and cited a supposed international consensus 
that health warnings featuring graphics were more effective than text-only 
warnings.378 The court quickly reminded readers, however, that even though 
more than thirty nations required pictorial elements in health warnings for 
tobacco products and other nations were considering such requirements, 
“the constitutions of these countries do not necessarily protect individual 
liberties as stringently as does the United States Constitution.”379 
The D.C. Circuit noted that that the FDA selected the nine graphic im-
ages described earlier after reviewing the results of a commissioned study of 
18,000 consumers and after reviewing and responding to more than a thou-
sand comments.380 The court then singled out comments to which, it suggest-
ed, the FDA had not paid sufficient heed.381 These comments, as summarized 
by the court, faulted the FDA’s study for not producing adequate evidence 
that the use of warnings with graphic elements would reduce smoking 
rates.382 The reduction of smoking rates notion played a recurring role in the 
                                                                                                                         
375 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
376 Id. at 1211. For descriptions of the images, see supra text accompanying notes 
105–09. Recall that in Discount Tobacco, the court upheld the TCA’s requirement that a 
to-be-devised graphic element form part of the required rotating warnings, but that the 
actual images the FDA devised were not before the court. See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 
551–52. 
377 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221–22. 
378 Id. at 1209. 
379 Id. at 1209 n.3. 
380 Id. at 1209. 
381 See id. at 1209–11. 
382 See id. at 1210. 
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majority opinion, as the court consistently came back to that notion as being 
the overriding, or perhaps only, purpose underlying the FDA regulation ap-
proving the particular images.383 
Before identifying the appropriate First Amendment test to govern the 
case, the R.J. Reynolds court observed that “[t]he only question before us 
is whether FDA’s promulgation of the graphic warning labels—which 
incorporate the textual warnings, a corresponding graphic image, and the 
‘1–800–QUIT–NOW’ cessation hotline number—violates the First 
Amendment.”384 The court flirted with the possibility of analyzing the 
case under strict scrutiny and the full First Amendment protection it con-
templates.385 In that flirtation, the majority cited the Supreme Court’s 
compelled speech decisions regarding noncommercial settings,386 and 
went on to observe that “[t]his case contains elements of compulsion and 
forced subsidization” of the government’s “ideological and not informa-
tional” message.387 Although it acknowledged that the government may 
mandate warnings to consumers about dangerous products, the court con-
tended that “this case raises novel questions about the scope of govern-
ment’s authority to force the manufacturer of a product to go beyond mak-
ing purely factual and accurate commercial disclosures and undermine its 
own economic interest” by making it communicate “the government’s 
anti-smoking message.”388 
Just as it appeared poised to hold that strict scrutiny would govern the 
analysis, the D.C. Circuit court stepped back and noted that because the 
FDA’s graphic images pertained to tobacco companies’ marketing of their 
                                                                                                                         
383 See id. at 1216–21. In his dissent, Judge Rogers faulted the majority for ignoring 
another key purpose underlying the TCA and the FDA regulations that stemmed from it. 
See infra text accompanying notes 406–14. 
384 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211. In addition, the court stated that the tobacco 
companies “do not dispute Congress’s authority to require health warnings on cigarette 
packages, nor do they challenge the substance of any of the nine textual statements 
mandated by the [TCA].” Id. When the court’s careful phrasing in identifying the issues and 
non-issues is considered alongside its later reasoning in invalidating the actual graphic 
images, one wonders whether the court might have struck down the TCA’s general 
requirement that graphic images be included in the health warnings if that requirement had 
been raised as an issue in the case. 
385 See id. at 1211–13. In granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the district 
court had applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 1212–13, 1217. 
386 Id. at 1211. Wooley v. Maynard was among the cases the court cited. Id.; see 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
387 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211. 
388 Id. at 1212. The court also observed that “[i]n effect, the graphic images are not 
warnings, but admonitions: ‘[D]on’t buy or use this product.’” Id. at 1211. 
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products, commercial speech principles apparently should control.389 But 
as the Sixth Circuit had to do in Discount Tobacco when it ruled on the 
TCA’s requirement that to-be-devised graphic images form part of the 
required warnings, the R.J. Reynolds court needed to decide which set of 
commercial speech principles would apply. Would it be Zauderer’s test 
for required disclosures, or Central Hudson’s test for restrictions?390 
The R.J. Reynolds court concluded that the Zauderer framework did not 
apply.391 Zauderer, the court noted, called for review “akin to rational-basis 
review”392 if the commercial speech disclosures the government required 
were of factual, noncontroversial information and were reasonably related 
to prevention of consumer deception.393 The court expressed doubt about 
whether the graphic images provided factual information, as opposed to 
communicating opinions or being mere devices for evoking emotional re-
sponses.394 Moreover, returning to the notion that the FDA’s graphic images 
were designed only to produce a reduction in smoking rates, the court con-
cluded that because prevention of consumer deception supposedly was not 
an underlying purpose, the graphic images could not be treated as disclo-
sures subject to review under Zauderer.395 Accordingly, the court reasoned, 
                                                                                                                         
389 See id. at 1213, 1217. The court noted that in so concluding, it was following the 
lead of one of its own decisions in which commercial speech principles had been applied 
to required corrective disclosures. Id. at 1217; see United States v. Philip Morris USA 
Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1142–45 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (the government’s civil RICO case against 
tobacco companies). 
390 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213, 1217. For discussion of this choice in Discount 
Tobacco, see supra text accompanying notes 345–57. Either way, the D.C. Circuit 
maintained in R.J. Reynolds, “a thorny question remains: how much leeway should ... the 
government [receive] when it seeks to compel a product’s manufacturer to convey the 
state’s subjective—and perhaps even ideological—view that consumers should reject this 
otherwise legal, but disfavored, product?” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212. 
391 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17. The D.C. Circuit thus resolved the Zauderer-or-
Central Hudson question the opposite way the Discount Tobacco majority resolved it in its 
ruling on the TCA’s graphic images provision. See supra text accompanying notes 345–57. 
392 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212. 
393 Id.; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
394 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17. 
395 See id. at 1216–17. The court strained to reason that the graphic images could not 
be seen as designed to prevent consumers from having misimpressions about health risks 
because the TCA’s sections other than the warning-requirement section (such as the 
provision restricting the use of terms such as “light” or “mild”) were designed to deal 
with, and apparently took care of, the problem of consumers being deceived or mislead 
about health risks. See id. at 1214–15. Nor was the majority swayed by the argument that 
the graphic images should be evaluated against the backdrop of tobacco companies’ 
history of misrepresentations of health risks. The court observed that the regulation 
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the usual commercial speech rules—those provided by Central Hudson—
would have to control the analysis.396 
Applying the Central Hudson test, the D.C. Circuit began by “assum-
ing” that reducing smoking rates was a substantial government interest.397 
The court then criticized studies relied on by the FDA as presenting “ques-
tionable social science”398 and stressed that the government’s evidence 
concerning other nations’ required pictorial health warnings did not 
demonstrate a direct link between those warnings and a smoking-rate 
reduction attributable to such a requirement.399 Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the government had not shown that the graphic images chosen by 
the FDA would result in a reduction of smoking rates.400 This meant that 
the government had failed Central Hudson’s direct-advancement element 
and that the graphic images therefore violated the First Amendment.401 
The R.J. Reynolds majority’s application of the Central Hudson test 
again featured the court’s insistence that reduction of smoking rates was 
the sole objective underlying the FDA-devised graphic images.402 Perhaps 
only to respond to a key point in Judge Rogers’s dissent that effectively 
communicating health risks in order to correct misimpressions was also a 
government objective underlying the graphic images,403 the majority 
acknowledged that the FDA had asserted such an objective during the 
litigation.404 However, the court maintained, effective communication of 
health risks was “not an independent interest capable of sustaining” the 
FDA’s graphic images; rather, it was “merely a description of the means 
by which [the FDA] plans to accomplish its goal of reducing smoking 
rates.”405 
Judge Rogers vigorously dissented. He maintained that with the excep-
tion of the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” element, the images devised by the FDA 
would pass First Amendment muster under either Zauderer or Central 
                                                                                                                         
setting forth the graphic images did not specify that the images were meant to combat 
specific deceptive claims by the tobacco industry. See id. at 1215–16. 
396 See id. at 1217. 
397 Id. at 1218. 
398 Id. at 1219. 
399 See id.  
400 See id. at 1219–20. 
401 See id. at 1219–21. 
402 See id. at 1218. 
403 Id. at 1235–36 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
404 See id. at 1221 (majority opinion). 
405 Id.  
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Hudson.406 Judge Rogers chided the majority for its refusal to treat effective 
communication of health risks as a government interest underlying the 
graphic images.407 That interest, he asserted, was consistent with a goal 
of preventing consumers from holding misimpressions regarding health 
risks and thus made the graphic images prevention-of-deception re-
quirements for purposes of Zauderer.408 In addition, Judge Rogers criti-
cized the majority for evaluating the graphic images as if they stood on 
their own rather than as they would actually appear: in conjunction with 
the textual elements of the required warnings.409 Viewed in conjunction 
with the textual elements, the graphic images communicated factual 
information or at least aided in communicating the factual information in 
the textual elements, a further reason for saying that the images should 
be sustained under the Zauderer test.410 
Even if Zauderer did not apply and Central Hudson furnished the con-
trolling framework, Judge Rogers continued, the graphic images should be 
sustained.411 Again chastising the majority for not treating effective com-
munication of health risks as a government interest to be considered, he 
stressed that such an interest is substantial in nature and that the graphic 
images would directly advance the interest in a narrowly tailored way.412 
Concerning the direct-advancement element, the FDA should be able to 
pass that hurdle on the basis of common sense, the studies the agency 
relied on, and other nations’ perceptions of whether the pictorial images in 
their required health warnings more effectively communicated health risks 
than text-only warnings.413 Regarding both the direct-advancement ele-
ment and the narrow tailoring element, indications that longstanding tex-
tual warnings had not eliminated misimpressions about health risks should 
justify taking a new approach involving the graphic images.414 
The following section considers the implications of existing interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment for the current TCA provisions and for possible 
                                                                                                                         
406 Id. at 1222–23 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Judge Rogers concluded that regardless of 
whether Zauderer or Central Hudson controlled, the inclusion of the “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” statement in the graphic images could not be justified. Id. at 1223, 1236. 
407 Id. 
408 Id. at 1223, 1225, 1227–34. Judge Rogers also asserted that tobacco companies’ 
past history of deception and covering-up of health risks should be kept in mind when 
evaluating the warning requirements. See id. at 1224, 1228–29. 
409 Id. 
410 Id. at 1230–34. 
411 Id. 
412 Id. at 1234–35. 
413 Id. at 1235–36. 
414 Id. 
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future statutory and administrative measures regulating tobacco advertising 
and promotion. It assesses the reasoning employed in the Discount Tobacco 
and R.J. Reynolds decisions discussed above, explores what Congress and the 
FDA should and should not be able to do in requiring and devising new 
graphic images for use in the required health warnings, and considers how the 
Supreme Court should rule if a Discount Tobacco or R.J. Reynolds-type case 
were to come before it. 
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT LINE-DRAWING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT 
AND FUTURE REGULATORY EFFORTS 
How did the Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds courts do in regard to 
soundness of reasoning? Answering that question begins the process of 
determining what actions Congress and the FDA can and should be able to 
take in terms of regulating tobacco advertising and promotion without vio-
lating the First Amendment. As the following analysis will indicate, “gener-
ally quite well” should be the answer regarding the Discount Tobacco court, 
with the R.J. Reynolds court meriting an “on the whole, poorly” response. 
A. Assessing Discount Tobacco 
The range and different natures of the TCA provisions challenged in 
Discount Tobacco made the Sixth Circuit’s task a difficult one. Add the 
different lines of potentially applicable reasoning stemming from the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment decisions,415 and a court in the Sixth 
Circuit’s position has an even more difficult assignment. Throw in the 
not-always-clear suggestions from the Supreme Court that the relevant 
First Amendment rules and tests may need changing or may already be 
undergoing subtle shading,416 and a task of the sort faced by the Discount 
Tobacco court becomes tougher yet. 
Considering the just-noted factors, the Sixth Circuit produced a solid, 
well-reasoned, and well-supported decision in Discount Tobacco. In up-
holding most of the TCA provisions that amounted to restrictions on to-
bacco advertising and marketing, the court properly rejected the tobacco 
companies’ arguments that strict scrutiny should be applied to at least 
some of the restrictions.417 If courts were to give credence to tobacco 
                                                                                                                         
415 See supra text accompanying notes 164–232, 263–307. 
416 See supra text accompanying notes 199–263. 
417 See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 522, 
525–26, 532–33, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). For a less favorable assessment of Discount Tobacco than 
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companies’ argument that restrictions on what they may say in labeling 
and advertising should be subjected to strict scrutiny because comments 
on health issues outside the labeling and context would trigger very sub-
stantial First Amendment protection, the distinction between commercial 
speech and noncommercial speech would be all-but obliterated, and the 
government’s ability to regulate in the interest of promoting public health 
would be severely impaired. There would also be a paradoxical and inde-
fensible effect: the greater the health risks or dangers associated with a 
widely used product (and hence the greater the chance that major health 
concerns would be present), the lesser the ability of government to restrict 
reasonable amounts of speech in an effort to safeguard public health. 
Moreover, accepting tobacco companies’ strict scrutiny argument 
would run contrary to a longstanding line of Supreme Court decisions to 
which the Court still adheres despite hints about possible changes in the 
rules.418 A federal court of appeals obviously cannot give Supreme Court 
hints primacy over actual Supreme Court holdings, especially when the 
Supreme Court itself has not permitted the hints to translate into new rules 
despite little check on its doing so except for an easy-to-get-around tradi-
tion of adherence to precedent.419 In Discount Tobacco, the Sixth Circuit 
commendably stuck with the Central Hudson test for commercial speech 
restrictions and applied it both realistically and with appropriate rigor, not 
to mention evenhandedly. 
The Discount Tobacco court should also be commended for how it 
dealt with the Supreme Court’s 2011 Sorrell decision, which is to say that 
the Sixth Circuit for the most part did not attempt to deal with the puzzling 
Supreme Court decision. Recall that in Sorrell, the Supreme Court spent 
considerable time discussing a supposed need for “heightened scrutiny” of 
certain commercial speech restrictions. Which ones? Evidently those that 
bar a commercial speaker from disclosing or using certain information for 
marketing purposes when other speakers are permitted to use the very 
same information for non-marketing purposes, though the Court was less 
than clear about whether heightened scrutiny should be applied only then 
or perhaps more broadly.420 In Sorrell, the Court worried that pharmaceu-
tical companies had been singled out for adverse treatment regarding their 
                                                                                                                         
the one offered here, see Danielle Weatherby & Terri R. Day, The Butt Stops Here: The 
Tobacco Control Act’s Anti-Smoking Regulations Run Afoul of the First Amendment, 76 
ALB. L. REV. 121, 140–43 (2012/2013). 
418 See supra notes 174, 182; supra text accompanying notes 245–51. 
419 Even if the Supreme Court’s overruling of an earlier precedent is the exception 
rather than the rule, the exception has occurred with reasonable frequency over the years. 
420 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660-67 (2011). 
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marketing efforts.421 But in the end the Court backed away from the 
heightened scrutiny rationale it floated, and officially relied on Central 
Hudson for the controlling framework.422 Other courts would do well to 
follow the Sixth Circuit’s Discount Tobacco example by applying Sorrell 
only for what it actually did in deciding the case under Central Hudson, by 
noting Sorrell’s mention of the need to be suspicious of governmental 
attempts to keep the public in the dark through speech restrictions,423 and 
by then letting the sleeping Sorrell dog lie, pending clarification from the 
Supreme Court on what (if anything) to make of the heightened scrutiny 
analysis in commercial speech cases. 
The Discount Tobacco court also provided a model for other courts, 
including the Supreme Court, to follow in distinguishing between com-
mercial speech restrictions and required commercial speech disclosures 
and in properly applying the relevant Supreme Court precedents. The 
Sixth Circuit’s appropriate applications of the Central Hudson test for 
evaluating commercial speech restrictions have already been noted. The 
court likewise insightfully applied Zauderer’s test for required commercial 
speech disclosures to the TCA’s requirement that graphic images be part 
of the required health warning on cigarette packages and in cigarette ad-
vertisements.424 As held in Zauderer and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court 
in the 2010 Milavetz decision, required disclosures of factual information 
in commercial speech settings do not violate the First Amendment if they 
are reasonably related to prevention of consumer deception.425 
In sustaining the TCA’s graphic images requirement, the Discount To-
bacco court sensibly concluded that graphic images can be just as accurate 
as textual statements of fact and that, to the extent they accompany the 
indisputably accurate statements in the textual portions of the warning, the 
graphic images should be treated as conveying factual information.426 
Then, appropriately taking into account a key TCA purpose of more effec-
tively communicating health risks of tobacco product use and thereby 
lessening the chances that consumers would suffer from misimpressions, 
the court concluded that the graphic image requirement was effectively a 
                                                                                                                         
421 Id. at 2663. The horror! Don’t commercial speech restrictions commonly do this? 
422 Id. at 2667. 
423 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 546 (6th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1996 (2013); see 
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671. 
424 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). 
425 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 
249–50 (2010). 
426 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558–59. 
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prevention-of-deception requirement.427 The court took what appeared to 
be a substance-over-form approach that correctly considered the TCA’s 
purposes, and in particular, a purpose stated in the federal statute whose 
warning requirement the TCA amended, but whose statement of purpose 
remained unchanged.428 Finally, the Sixth Circuit was equally on the mark 
in concluding that the graphic images requirement was reasonably related 
to the previously discussed purpose in light of the evidence indicating that 
minors and other members of the public still do not fully understand the 
nature and extent of the health risks despite the fact that textual warnings 
have been required for many years.429 
One quarrel with the Discount Tobacco decision should be noted, 
however. It is a fairly small quarrel about a matter of a harmless-error 
nature, given how the case came out, but the error would not be so harm-
less if committed by another court in a future case. The Discount Tobacco 
court correctly noted that Zauderer’s applicable test for required commer-
cial speech disclosures furnishes less First Amendment protection than 
does the usual treatment of commercial speech.430 Then, however, the 
court observed that if a required commercial speech disclosure does not 
qualify for Zauderer treatment (if, for instance, it does not deal with factu-
al information or it is not meant to prevent consumer deception), the Su-
preme Court’s compelled speech precedents control and strict scrutiny is 
applied.431 Although the Supreme Court may have offered suggestions in 
that regard, it has not clearly held that the compelled speech decisions, 
which deal with noncommercial speech, automatically apply to required 
commercial speech disclosures that fall outside the Zauderer umbrella.432 
The supposed jump all the way to full First Amendment protection when 
Zauderer does not apply to a required commercial speech disclosure is 
                                                                                                                         
427 Id. at 558–61, 562–64. 
428 See id.; see supra text accompanying notes 25–28, 81–85 (discussing Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act’s stated purpose of using warning requirement to 
inform public of health risks of smoking, and noting that purposes section of FCLAA has 
remained unchanged even after TCA’s modifications of FCLAA’s warning requirement). 
429 See 674 F.3d at 561–64. It is perhaps a bit surprising that the court did not devote 
more discussion to the tobacco companies’ objection that the required size of the 
warnings amounted to an unreasonable and unduly burdensome requirement, but the 
court did note that the plaintiffs had made no showing that they could not get the 
marketing messages across in the spaces still available to them. Id. at 530–31. Moreover, 
the court no doubt was influenced by the legal reality that the government only had to 
prove a reasonable relationship to its purpose of more effectively informing consumers of 
health risks. 
430 Id. at 561–62. 
431 Id. at 554. 
432 See infra text accompanying notes 470–79. 
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either erroneous or should be erroneous. More logically, a required com-
mercial speech disclosure to which Zauderer does not apply remains in the 
commercial speech realm and should be considered under the test consti-
tuting the next-higher level of protection: the Central Hudson test. 
B. Assessing R.J. Reynolds 
The R.J. Reynolds decision includes far less of which to approve. Per-
haps the best piece of advice to courts deciding tobacco advertising-related 
cases is this: read Judge Rogers’s dissent and pay attention to his analysis. 
Lest the previous statement seem too harsh, a positive aspect of Judge 
Brown’s majority opinion should be noted: its correct conclusion that if a 
required commercial speech disclosure does not qualify for Zauderer 
treatment, the Central Hudson test, not strict scrutiny, furnishes the con-
trolling framework.433 Otherwise, however, the R.J. Reynolds decision 
reflected flawed reasoning. 
With a number of its initial comments summarized earlier, the D.C. 
Circuit seemed to prefer the idea of applying strict scrutiny to the FDA 
regulation setting forth the graphic images developed in response to the 
TCA directive.434 Circuit precedent indicated, however, that commercial 
speech principles should control.435 But commercial speech principles 
would serve well enough as a basis for invalidating the graphic images, 
the court seemed to suggest, if the right set of those principles were ap-
plied in a rigorous enough manner.436 The court candidly referred to the 
Zauderer test for required commercial speech disclosures as rational-basis 
review437 and then proceeded with a strained analysis that seemed calcu-
lated to make certain that the more lenient test would be disqualified. 
As previous discussion noted, Judge Brown’s majority opinion consist-
ently invoked the notion that reduction of smoking rates was the only gov-
ernment purpose underlying the graphic images.438 This insistence defied 
legal and factual reality, for the FDA expressly also relied on a second gov-
ernment interest: more effectively communicating with consumers to lessen 
                                                                                                                         
433 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012). For a 
more charitable view of the R.J. Reynolds decision than the one offered here, see 
Weatherby & Day, supra note 417, at 140–43. 
434 See supra text accompanying notes 378–82. One suspects the court might have 
liked to tackle the TCA directive itself, but that requirement was not before the court. See 
696 F.3d at 1211. 
435 696 F.3d at 1216–17. 
436 Id. 
437 Id. at 1212. 
438 See supra text accompanying notes 382–83, 395, 402–05. 
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the likelihood that they would continue to experience misimpressions of 
the full nature and extent of the health risks associated with smoking.439 
Moreover, the R.J. Reynolds court’s refusal to acknowledge this purpose 
on the part of the government ignored legal and factual reality in another 
sense: the clear statement of such a purpose in findings set forth in the 
TCA and in the previously discussed Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act (FCLAA). The TCA’s provisions on required health warn-
ings (including the requirements that the warnings contain both textual and 
graphic elements) amended the FCLAA’s longstanding warning require-
ment but left the FCLAA’s purposes section unchanged.440 That purposes 
section spoke—and still speaks—in terms of effectively communicating 
health-risk information to consumers.441 
Surely a purpose set forth in the TCA findings and in the federal statute 
whose warning requirement the TCA amended should be seen as a purpose 
relied on by the FDA when it devised the graphic images in response to the 
TCA’s directive. But not for the R.J. Reynolds majority, whose strategy 
worked. If, as the majority maintained, more clearly communicating health 
risks information in order to prevent misimpressions among consumers 
was not a purpose underlying the graphic images, the required images 
could not qualify as deception-prevention disclosures under Zauderer.442 
With Zauderer knocked out as a potential source of guiding principles, 
Central Hudson’s higher standard of review would have to control.443 
Even though it does not furnish the level of protection strict scrutiny does, 
the Central Hudson test would be adequate to invalidate the graphic imag-
es if a certain purpose would be identified as the only one and the test’s 
final elements were applied rigorously. The R.J. Reynolds majority pro-
ceeded accordingly, again taking an artificially narrow view of the gov-
ernment’s underlying purposes and applying the test very strictly against 
the government.444 Again the court insisted that reducing smoking rates 
was the only purpose underlying the graphic images, but this time, perhaps 
                                                                                                                         
439 See 696 F.3d at 1223, 1225 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
440 See supra text accompanying notes 25–28, 81–85. 
441 Id. 
442 See 696 F.3d at 1214–16. For good measure, the court asserted that the images did 
not really amount to factual disclosures anyway. Id. at 1216–17. However, as Judge 
Rogers pointed out in his dissent, considering the graphic images alongside the textual 
elements, something the majority did not do even though the TCA obviously 
contemplated that graphics and text would appear together, would lead to a contrary 
conclusion about whether the graphic elements presented accurate information. Id. at 
1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
443 Id. at 1217 (majority opinion). 
444 See id. 
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concerned about the dissenting judge’s criticism that the court was ignor-
ing the government’s other underlying interest, the court added a further 
bit of contrived reasoning. The majority stated that more effectively com-
municating health risks information to consumers was only a means of 
serving the solitary interest in reducing smoking rates, and thus could not 
serve as a government interest in support of the statute.445 
So, with reduction of smoking rates being the only underlying gov-
ernment interest it would acknowledge, the R.J. Reynolds court could then 
apply the direct-advancement element of the Central Hudson very strictly 
against the government and hold that the government failed it by not prov-
ing that the FDA’s graphic images would actually produce lower smoking 
rates.446 The court’s approach would seem to pose an unreasonably high 
obstacle for the government to clear, in that doing so would likely require 
very long-term, elaborately-designed, and expensive studies of numerous 
possible graphic images in tightly controlled settings. In the meantime, the 
government would be spinning its protection-of-public-health wheels while 
a statutory command set forth in the TCA would go unfulfilled. 
Conveniently for the court, refusing to recognize improved communica-
tion of health risks information as an underlying government interest would 
keep the court from having to assert that the FDA’s judgment on what 
would likely be effective counts for naught despite the agency’s supposed 
expertise. Similarly, it would have been more difficult for the court to argue 
that other nations’ perceptions of how effectively pictorial images com-
municate health risks are irrelevant than it was for the court to point out that 
smoking rates had not necessarily declined in those countries. 
C. What Should Congress and the FDA Be Able to Do? 
If the various strains running through the Supreme Court’s previously 
discussed First Amendment precedents are properly applied, most of the 
tobacco advertising and marketing provisions Congress enacted in the 
TCA and its predecessor, the FCLAA, should stand on firm constitutional 
ground. The “[i]f the ... precedents are properly applied” qualifier in the 
previous sentence will be important, as this section will suggest and the 
following section will address more fully. 
With the Central Hudson test, as applied with the degree of rigor demon-
strated in Discount Tobacco, providing the controlling framework, these 
previously discussed TCA restrictions on advertising and promotion,447 
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below, make the First Amendment grade (as should corresponding FDA 
regulations that may be developed): 
 The product distribution provisions restricting self-service 
displays of tobacco products and requiring retail store per-
sonnel to assist in purchases. 
 The modified-risk products provisions, which require pre-
market approval by the FDA if certain previously identi-
fied representations are made by tobacco manufacturers or 
other sellers. 
 The prohibition on tobacco companies’ labeling or adver-
tising uses of such terms as “light” or “mild.” 
 The ban on tobacco companies’ distribution of free samples 
of tobacco products. 
 The ban on tobacco companies’ placement of tobacco prod-
uct names, logos, or symbols on non-tobacco merchandise. 
 The ban on tobacco companies’ use of tobacco brand 
names in sponsoring events. 
Each of the above restrictions reflects some combination of interests in 
protecting minors’ health, more effectively communicating health risks to 
minors and other members of the public in order to further better under-
standing of the full extent and nature of those risks, and reducing smoking 
levels among members of the public. Each restriction bears a sufficiently 
close relationship to the underlying government interests, without shutting 
off unreasonably large amounts of protected speech. 
Of the types of restrictions that the government cannot justify under cur-
rent commercial speech principles, the most significant is the TCA’s general 
requirement that most tobacco advertising employ only a black-and-white 
format, without color images. The Discount Tobacco court correctly struck 
down this restriction,448 which seems to bear only a speculative relationship 
to the underlying government interests and severely restricts advertising 
content and techniques that the Supreme Court has clearly said advertisers 
should be able to employ. The Court made such statements in Zauderer,449 
whose treatment of required commercial speech disclosures can work to the 
benefit of the government. If the government wishes to receive the benefit 
                                                                                                                         
448 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 545–48 (6th 
Cir. 2012). 
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of the disclosure requirements aspect of Zauderer,450 it does not seem un-
reasonable to expect the government to be bound by the decision’s language 
favoring advertisers even if that language is not to the government’s liking. 
Although the TCA called for reissuance of various mid-1990s FDA 
regulations that the Supreme Court struck down on lack-of authority 
grounds eight years before the enactment of the TCA, Congress did not 
direct the FDA to reissue earlier regulations that restricted outdoor adver-
tising of tobacco advertising within 1000 feet of schools, playgrounds, and 
other similar locations where minors would likely be present.451 It is just 
as well, given that the Supreme Court’s 2001 Lorillard decision struck 
down, on First Amendment grounds, very similar regulations imposed by 
the state of Massachusetts.452 
The TCA did contain a provision authorizing the FDA to consider 
whether there might be ways of engaging in similar outdoor advertising 
regulation while remaining in compliance with the First Amendment anal-
ysis set forth in Lorillard.453 “Good luck” should be the message to the 
FDA on this issue. Lorillard appears to leave little or no room for such 
regulation, even though the Court arguably was wrong in striking down 
what was a location restriction rather than a content restriction. Absent a 
very unlikely overruling of Lorillard by the Supreme Court, the FDA 
would more profitably apply its regulatory attention elsewhere. 
What about a commercial speech restriction that tobacco companies 
have never challenged on First Amendment grounds: the more than 
four-decades-old statutory ban on television or radio advertisements for 
cigarettes?454 Is this ban on solid ground? Perhaps it is, as a constitutional 
matter. As a practical matter, it almost certainly is. 
As earlier discussion revealed, tobacco companies did not challenge 
the electronic media advertising ban when it was enacted, with one of the 
possible reasons being the tobacco industry’s conclusion that ban was 
not such a bad deal because it also caused many anti-smoking messages 
to disappear from the airwaves.455 Now, however, First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech appears to be intensifying under the 
Supreme Court’s precedents. Therefore, tobacco companies would have 
at least a plausible argument that the electronic media advertising ban 
sweeps more broadly in restricting speech than would reasonably be 
necessary to further the underlying government interests. It is unclear 
                                                                                                                         
450 See supra text accompanying notes 269–307. 
451 See supra note 123. 
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2014]  TOBACCO ADVERTISING & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 405 
whether tobacco companies would succeed with that argument. But what 
seems clearer is the probability that no such First Amendment challenge 
will be brought. The longstanding nature of the TV and radio ban would 
not deprive the tobacco companies of their ability to bring a constitutional 
challenge, but the ban’s longstanding nature makes it such an institution 
that tobacco companies concerned about public relations would seem 
unlikely to institute the litigation. Similarly, a court ruling on such a chal-
lenge if one were filed might be inclined to find a way to uphold the well-
entrenched ban in order to avoid the appearance of being an applecart-
upsetting tool of the tobacco industry. 
The warning requirements called for in the TCA and the FCLAA (the 
predecessor statute that the TCA amended) are consistent with the First 
Amendment, though for reasons different from those supporting the regula-
tions discussed earlier. Unlike the Central Hudson–covered restrictions 
considered above, the warning mandates are of the disclosure requirements 
variety. As such, they are governed by the Zauderer test. Properly applied, 
Zauderer indicates that the warning requirements comply with the First 
Amendment. As the Discount Tobacco court concluded, this is true of the 
warnings’ textual components as well as the color graphics components 
contemplated by the TCA because each component serves to provide accu-
rate information regarding health risks in order to prevent misimpressions 
on the part of consumers.456 
Of course, the constitutionality of the TCA’s general requirement that 
the health warnings must include a to-be-devised color graphics element 
does not automatically mean that any graphic image the FDA adopts will 
automatically pass First Amendment muster. To qualify under Zauderer, 
graphic images must present accurate information consistent with the 
purpose of better educating consumers about health risks and thereby 
preventing misconceptions.457 The Discount Tobacco court offered hypo-
thetical examples that would be permissible under the First Amendment: 
an image showing the text of the warning in a child’s handwriting; a 
                                                                                                                         
456 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 561–64 (6th 
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picture or drawing a diseased lung alongside a healthy one; a picture of a 
physician reviewing an X-ray of a diseased lung, and so forth.458 
Although the R.J. Reynolds court struck down all of the graphic imag-
es devised by the FDA and the government later decided to develop new 
images instead of appealing the decision, some of the images should have 
been upheld. Bringing back any of those images in the same form would 
cause the FDA to encounter the wrath of the D.C. Circuit and would result 
in success for the FDA only if it could convince the Supreme Court that 
the D.C. Circuit ruled incorrectly. Rather than pursue that time-consuming 
avenue, the FDA may wish to consider modifying certain currently aban-
doned images listed earlier in the Article:459 the adult holding a small child 
with smoke visible in the air; the picture of the man with the tracheotomy; 
the picture of the diseased lungs; and the picture of the person with appar-
ently diseased lips and rotted-out teeth. With modifications more clearly 
tying the images to the textual warnings to which they correspond, the 
images should be upheld. The other now-abandoned graphic images listed 
earlier in the Article should remain abandoned. As deficient and artificial 
as the R.J. Reynolds court’s reasoning generally was, the court probably 
was right to strike down those other images. Also, the “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” mantra cannot qualify under Zauderer for the reasons noted in the 
majority and dissenting opinions in R.J. Reynolds,460 and therefore should 
not be employed. 
Finally, though it is a relatively close call, the TCA’s manner-of-display 
requirements for the required warning461 should be considered permissible. 
The specifications concerning warning size and location have attributes of 
required disclosures because they are meant to make the warning’s commu-
nication of health risks more noticeable and therefore more effective. Under 
a proper Zauderer analysis, the manner-of-display requirements would be 
upheld. But the manner-of-display requirements also operate as advertising 
restrictions because they limit the space tobacco manufacturers have to 
communicate messages they would prefer to communicate. In that sense, a 
Central Hudson analysis could be appropriate. Even if that test were ap-
plied, however, the manner-of-display requirements should be acceptable 
under the First Amendment, in light of the government interests at stake and 
the reality that the less prominently displayed warnings are likely often 
ignored and therefore less effective than they might be in communicating 
the extent of the relevant health risks. 
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D. Appropriate and Inappropriate Analyses if the Supreme Court Were 
to Rule 
If the Supreme Court hears a tobacco advertising and promotion case 
raising issues of the sort presented in Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds, 
the key lines of cases, of course, will be those in the Central Hudson line 
(for commercial speech restrictions) and those in the Zauderer line (for 
required commercial speech disclosures). Central Hudson has survived for 
more than three decades despite various Justices’ flirtations with scrapping 
it.462 However imperfect it may be, it has continued to win out over other 
possible frameworks. 
As earlier discussion revealed, the Supreme Court’s applications of the 
Central Hudson test in recent years have effectively moved the intermediate 
level of First Amendment protection it contemplates closer to the full First 
Amendment protection extended to noncommercial speech.463 It is probably 
too late in the game to reposition the intermediate level at a lower point, but 
the Court should be hesitant, particularly in a tobacco advertising case, to 
continue making commercial speech analysis ever more closely resemble 
noncommercial speech analysis. If the Court continues to do so, it risks 
what Justice Breyer has warned about in dissenting opinions: the danger that 
many well-established and important regulatory regimes could too readily 
be subjected to a First Amendment-based attack if they restrict speech in 
some incidental way.464 Tobacco advertising restrictions of the sort dis-
cussed in this Article are not incidental restrictions, but they are far from 
arbitrary and are part of larger regulatory schemes that are designed to 
address public health matters. The Court must be careful not to let expand-
ing protection for commercial speech unduly hamper the government’s 
ability to regulate in the interest of the public. 
When the Court reaffirmed Zauderer in the 2010 Milavetz decision, the 
Court sent an encouraging sign that it was continuing to evaluate certain 
commercial speech disclosure requirements differently from, and more 
leniently than, commercial speech restrictions.465 The Court should not 
retreat if faced with assessing the textual and graphic warnings called for by 
the TCA. In applying Zauderer, the Court should recognize that graphic 
images can be factual and accurate and thus potentially sustainable under 
                                                                                                                         
462 See supra notes 174, 182. 
463 See supra text accompanying notes 164–263. 
464 For discussion of Justice Breyer’s dissents, see supra notes 232 & 258–60, as well 
as supra text accompanying notes 257–60. 
465 For discussion of Zauderer and Milavetz, see supra text accompanying notes 
269–307. 
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those decisions’ test, as the Discount Tobacco court recognized but the R.J. 
Reynolds court failed to appreciate.466 Particular graphic images should 
then be evaluated for whether they communicate accurate information by 
viewing them along with the textual messages to which they correspond—
something the R.J. Reynolds court failed to do.467 
With regard to the Zauderer test’s element stating that the required dis-
closures must be for deception-prevention purposes,468 the Court should 
apply this element in a substance-over-form manner that allows a purpose 
sufficiently similar to deception-prevention to qualify as well. In the tobac-
co advertising context, the TCA’s objective of effectively communicating 
health risks information in order to prevent misconceptions should be seen 
as sufficiently close—as the Discount Tobacco court recognized.469 
What if required commercial speech disclosures do not qualify for Zau-
derer treatment? In that event, the Court should hold that the Central Hud-
son test controls. In so holding, the R.J. Reynolds court displayed a rare bit 
of correct decision-making.470 The Court should resist the temptation to 
invoke the compelled speech cases when Zauderer does not apply because 
the compelled speech decisions arose from noncommercial speech settings 
and involve principles of full First Amendment protection.471 Further blur-
ring of the commercial versus noncommercial line should be avoided. 
In addition, the Court should avoid the temptation to resort to the so-
called compelled subsidy cases if it has occasion to review the requirement 
                                                                                                                         
466 See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559–60 (6th 
Cir. 2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
id. at 1231–32 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
467 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
468 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
469 See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–64. 
470 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217. Other commentators are comfortable with the 
notion that if Zauderer does not apply to a required disclosure, some form of strict 
scrutiny should be triggered. See Weatherby & Day, supra note 417, at 154–58, 163; 
Calvert, Allen-Brunner, & Locke, supra note 65, at 236–43. However, too much 
application of what have historically been noncommercial speech principles to the 
commercial speech setting creates risks, as Justice Breyer has pointed out, that too many 
regulatory programs could be subject to hamstringing First Amendment challenges. See 
supra notes 258–60 and supra text accompanying notes 257–60. 
471 For discussion of the compelled speech cases and their noncommercial speech 
contexts, see supra text accompanying notes 274–80. Other commentators have 
advocated importing the compelled speech cases into the commercial speech realm. See 
Keighley, supra note 135, at 544–72; Calvert, Allen-Brunner, & Locke, supra note 65, at 
236–43. Again, however, too much match-up in the analytical frameworks governing 
commercial and noncommercial speech risks the dangers referred to in the preceding 
note. See supra note 470. 
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for warnings featuring graphic elements. The compelled subsidy cases 
address the question of whether a company in a certain industry can be 
required, under a federal regulatory regime that extensively regulates the 
industry, to pay monetary assessments to support industry-promoting 
advertisements. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,472 a 1997 
decision, the Court held that there was no First Amendment violation in 
the requirement that fruit growers pay assessments to fund generic adver-
tisements for fruit-growers as part of an extensive federal regulatory re-
gime dealing with such fruit-growers.473 Yet four years later, in United 
States v. United Foods, Inc.,474 the Court held that there was a First 
Amendment violation when a mushroom grower was compelled to pay 
assessments to fund generic advertisements for mushroom growers gener-
ally.475 The Court distinguished Wileman Brothers on the ground that the 
regulatory regime there was more extensive than in United Foods and on 
the further ground that in United Foods, the speech-affecting provision 
appeared to be the primary purpose of the regulatory efforts rather than a 
more incidental component.476 
The warning requirements contemplated by the TCA seem different 
from the specific monetary assessments present in the compelled subsidy 
cases, though, of course, tobacco companies are expected to cover the costs 
of ensuring that their product packages and advertisements comply with the 
required warnings. If the Court were to apply the compelled subsidy cases, 
however, the highly detailed regulatory regime set forth in the TCA would 
be a complicating factor in the decision whether Wileman Bros. or, in-
stead, United Foods would control. The Court probably should steer clear 
of the compelled subsidy cases if it is faced with evaluating the required 
health warnings for tobacco products because the compelled subsidy deci-
sions are an uncertain mess, and a mess complicated by another decision 
invoking the government speech doctrine. In Johanns v. Livestock Market-
ing Ass’n,477 a 2005 decision, the Court held that a monetary assessment 
imposed on beef producers in order to fund generic ads of the sort present in 
                                                                                                                         
472 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
473 Id. at 463, 475–77. 
474 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
475 Id. at 408, 412–16. 
476 Id. Notably, the Court mentioned that it was not considering the government’s 
argument that it should prevail on the basis of the emerging government speech doctrine, 
because the government had not made such an argument in the Court of Appeals. Id. at 
416–17. The government speech argument would soon surface in the arguably similar 
case referred to shortly in the text. 
477 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
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Wileman Brothers and United Foods did not violate the First Amendment 
because the ads funded by the assessment constituted government speech.478 
Although the specific contours of the government speech doctrine re-
main less than clearly defined, active government control of the message 
to be communicated appears to be a necessary prerequisite for application 
of the doctrine.479 If the Court were deciding a case dealing with the re-
quired health warnings for tobacco products, an opening of the door to 
consideration of the compelled subsidy cases would likely cause the Court 
to have to consider whether the government speech doctrine would apply. 
After all, the content of the mandatory warning is scripted by the govern-
ment. The Court may very well want to stay out of the compelled subsidy-
government speech thicket. 
Previous discussion focused on the 2011 Sorrell decision, in which the 
Court floated a trial balloon regarding supposed “heightened scrutiny” for 
certain commercial speech decisions but ultimately came back to the Central 
Hudson case for the actually controlling principles.480 If deciding a tobacco 
advertising case or, for that matter, any commercial speech case, the Court 
should not attempt to extend the heightened scrutiny approach to any situa-
tions other than the one present in Sorrell (a government restriction on mar-
keting-related disclosures or uses of certain information where that very 
same information can be widely disclosed and used for other purposes).481 
Extending Sorrell any further would needlessly muddy the commercial 
speech waters and would, as Justice Breyer stressed in his Sorrell dissent, 
open up too many regulatory programs to First Amendment-based attacks.482 
Finally, some members of the Court have at times stated or hinted 
that commercial speech should not be treated differently from noncom-
mercial speech for First Amendment purposes.483 Yet the distinction in 
levels of protection still exists, as it should. Abolishing the distinction 
and extending full protection to commercial speech would too drastically 
impair governmental ability to regulate on matters of public health, safe-
ty, and welfare. Moreover, using a tobacco advertising case as a vehicle 
for abolishing the distinction would seem especially inappropriate, given 
tobacco use’s regrettable status as “perhaps the single most significant 
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479 See id. at 560–62. 
480 See supra text accompanying notes 233–63. 
481 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660–64 (2011). 
482 See id. at 2673–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For further discussion of this dissent, 
see supra notes 258–60 and supra text accompanying notes 257–60. 
483 See supra notes 174, 182. 
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threat to public health in the United States.”484 One doubts whether even 
those Justices who favor treating commercial speech and noncommercial 
speech alike would want to risk being perceived as residing in the pockets 
of the tobacco industry. 
CONCLUSION 
With the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act of 2009 (TCA), the federal government launched a major effort 
to regulate the advertising and promotion of tobacco products. It was by no 
means the government’s first effort in that regard, because federally re-
quired health warnings have appeared on tobacco product packages and in 
advertisements for such products for more than four decades and televised 
advertisements for cigarettes have been banned for roughly the same 
length of time. But the TCA marked a significant expansion and ramping-
up of the government’s regulatory regime. Through a combination of TCA 
measures directly regulating tobacco product promotion and directions to 
the FDA to develop appropriate rules, Congress sought more effective 
ways to communicate the health risks of tobacco use to the public—
especially to minors. Congress also sought in the TCA to lessen the influ-
ence of tobacco companies’ promotional activities on minors and to lower 
smoking rates among minors as well as the public generally. 
The new regulatory regime set up by the TCA restricted tobacco adver-
tising and promotion in various ways. It also significantly modified the long-
required health warnings that must appear on tobacco product packages and 
in advertisements by requiring the inclusion of color graphics along with the 
text of the warnings and by specifying that the text-and-graphics warning be 
very prominently displayed on packages and in advertisements. In addition, 
the TCA directed the FDA to develop particular graphic images that the 
tobacco industry would be required to use in their display of the federally 
mandated warnings. Tobacco companies have brought First Amendment-
based challenges to the TCA’s various advertising and promotion provisions 
and to the FDA’s later-promulgated regulation setting forth particular graph-
ic images for required use by the tobacco industry. One federal circuit upheld 
most, but not all, of the TCA’s advertising and promotion provisions. Anoth-
er circuit invalidated the graphic images devised by the FDA and sent the 
agency back to the drawing board. 
                                                                                                                         
484 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000); Lorillard 
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Proper resolution of the First Amendment issues associated with the 
TCA and related FDA regulations depends upon appropriate navigation of 
different free speech streams set forth in Supreme Court precedents. This 
Article’s exploration of those streams and its analysis of the two key fed-
eral circuit decisions lead to the conclusion that if properly applied, rele-
vant First Amendment principles should provide the government a fairly 
long but not limitless leash when it regulates tobacco advertising and pro-
motion. The Article also furnishes guidance to courts and regulators on 
particular measures Congress and the FDA should and should not be able 
to employ in light of the First Amendment. The Article’s cautionary re-
marks about First Amendment thickets to avoid should also be useful if 
the Supreme Court opts to decide a tobacco advertising case and seeks to 
rule in a way that does not inject further confusion into an already too-
disjointed area of the law. 
